



Daily Report

East Europe

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Croatian Refugees Must Leave Germany by April

94BA0061B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
16 Oct 93 p 8

[Article by Nenad Ivankovic: "Germany: Expulsion of Croatian Refugees on 'Hold' Until 30 April 1994: Croats Go Home!"]

[Text] *The German authorities will allow refugees from our country to stay in Germany for the winter but in the spring they must go home—whether or not they have one.*

Bonn—The German federal minister and his 16 provincial colleagues have agreed to extend the residence permits of war refugees from Croatia only one more time—and thus for the last time!

This decision relates to all those who arrived in Germany as war refugees prior to 22 May 1992. Some of these people have already been threatened with expulsion, but under the new decision tolerance (Duldung) will be extended for them until 31 January 1994. After that, they will be officially expelled from the country, but with a three-month deadline for departure, which means that they will have a place to stay until 30 April 1994. After that date, there will be no new extension and all such people will have to leave Germany.

However, those who also arrived in Germany before 22 May 1992, who thus far have not been threatened with deportation, will get a final extension of their stay until 30 April 1994, after which they, like the first group, will be forced to leave Germany.

The Croatian Embassy in Bonn has been informed of all this, and we have learned that for now there are no prospects that this decision by the federal and provincial ministries of internal affairs will change.

In explaining the decision, the German side stresses that thus far the residence permits of war refugees from Croatia have been extended not because it was felt that they would be in general danger upon returning to their homeland, but rather because Croatia was burdened with refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This last extension was justified by the onset of winter and by the possibility of humanitarian problems. But after winter, according to the German side, practically all such reasons no longer apply, despite the fact that nearly one-third of Croatia is still under occupation and a big question remains: Will the situation change that much by spring so that the return of displaced persons to their homes will be possible?

According to official estimates (because there are no precise figures), there are around 300,000 war refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in Germany. It is hard to say exactly how many of them are from Croatia alone, but there is no doubt that they are in the majority. Most of these people are staying with relatives or friends, and some of them are with German families.

As the local media have reported, in the majority of cases the German state has provided practically no monetary support for the refugees. In the vast majority of cases, the burden has been and continues to be borne by private individuals and by charitable-humanitarian organizations.

Given the situation in Croatia, the return of 100,000 to 200,000 war refugees in the upcoming return from Germany could have undesirable sociological and psychological consequences. Because of this, everything should be done, beginning now, to plan this return and organize it in such a way that these people can be integrated into normal life. Perhaps the German side would be willing to participate in this in financial and material terms. Ultimately, the problem of war refugees from Croatia and Bosnia cannot become a problem of the Croatian state alone, or even predominantly.

Albanian Refugees Expelled by Greek Authorities*AU2710162693 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 27 Oct 93*

[Text] On the basis of information from the Kakavije border crossing, some 2150 Albanian refugees have been returned to Albania by the Greek police authorities. Most of those who have been forcibly returned have been working or living in Athens. Of these, 48 had valid visas. There are no reports of maltreatment. The Gjirokaster Police Commissariat, in cooperation with the Gjirokaster Army Division Command, are taking measures to organize the transportation of the returned emigrants to various districts.

Ministry Spokesman Comments*AU2710171593 Paris AFP in English 1649 GMT 27 Oct 93*

[Text] Tirana, Oct 27 (AFP)—Greece has resumed its mass deportation of Albanian immigrants expelling more than 2,200 of them overnight in an operation that was continuing Wednesday, Interior Ministry spokesman Ludmila Pajo said here.

The expulsions were carried out until midnight Tuesday and resumed at dawn Wednesday, according to Ajat Selibasha, a police officer stationed in the southern Albanian town of Gjirokaster.

Selibasha, who was contacted by phone by AFP, said 2,105 Albanians arrived at the Kakavia border post Tuesday.

The expulsions came a day after Greece recalled its ambassador to Albanian and its consul-general in Gjirokaster after lodging an official protest with the Albanian Government over alleged harassment of the Greek minority living in the southern Albanian village of Krania where the Greek school was shut down.

Tirana on Tuesday dismissed the Greek charges of harassment.

Officials here said they had no specifics on the exact number of Albanian expelled since Tuesday via the border posts of Kakavia, Kapstica and Saranda.

Pajo said five of the Albanians who arrived Tuesday in Saranda had been mistreated but he did not elaborate.

Athens authorities in July expelled nearly 25,000 of the up to 300,000 ethnic Albanian living in Greece saying that they were illegally in the country.

But Albanian authorities have said that many of those being expelled were legitimate residents.

The two countries have often been at loggerheads over the question of the Greek Orthodox minority living in southern Albania. Tirana authorities estimate their number at 57,000 while Athens claims it is closer to 400,000.

Bank Governor Hoti's Resignation Viewed*AU2610110093 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 21 Oct 93 p 1*

[Article by Erion Brace: "Ilir Hoti, Governor of the Albanian State Bank, Removed From Office"]

[Text] "President Berisha approved the resignation of Ilir Hoti, governor of the Albanian State Bank, and appointed Mr. Dylber Vrioni in his place." This was the news carried by Albanian Television in all its Tuesday [19 Oct] news broadcasts. The news, which it must be said was in code [as published], provoked reactions and at the same time amazement because of the fact that the central Albanian Bank and its Governor Ilir Hoti have played a central role in the reduction of inflation to zero, the rise of the Albanian foreign debt to \$623 million, and all the other victories achieved during the 18 months of the Meksi government.

Ilir Hoti, the sole person kept in the government's composition from the Stability Government through the Technical Government and into the Democratic Party's [PD] Meksi government, carries on his shoulders a heavy weight of suspicions and accusations relating to the Arsidi scandal. In the two parliamentary interpellations connected with this scandal, Hoti has been able to behave with calm, but a relative calm when faced with contradictory replies within the same interpellation, or from one to another, especially following the strong reactions of deputies Imami and Pashko and the Socialist deputies. What was to have followed Hoti's relative calm was his silence, alongside the silence of the responsible authorities investigating his position. However, it was not to be an endless silence. The Christian Democrat deputy Alberto Alessi, chairman of the Italian parliamentary commission for aid and cooperation with Albania, issued one accusation after another: The PD had been financed during the election campaign by a connection [tangent] to the tune of \$400,000, thus making Berisha, Ruli, and Hoti directly responsible. Another accusation followed. The Albanian Government had paid the sum of \$1,600,000 to the secret negotiator Nicolae Arsidi at a time when Giuliano Amato and subsequently Andreata were recognized as official negotiators. Although in panic, the Albanian side of the corruption still demonstrated calm. The two Albanian bankers Tartari and Salii and the former prime minister Vilson Ahmeti were brought to trial under the charge of misuse of office, leaving in the shade the Albanian bank governor Ilir Hoti, and Finance Minister Genc Ruli in still greater darkness. The courtroom, which was turned into an arena of war between the Albanian bankers and former Prime Minister Ahmeti, with Ilir Hoti as a "professional witness," declared the bankers and the former prime minister guilty of misuse of office, but also revealed the professional incompetence and involvement in corruption of bank governor Hoti and Finance Minister Ruli. Nevertheless, in his verdict, Judge Krehnik Spahiu responded to the dissatisfaction and to the many accusations leveled against

these two persons by saying, "The court tries and judges only those persons sent to it for trial," thus leaving open the cases against Messrs. Hoti and Ruli, whose names were often cited by the court. The judge also called on all persons aware of evidence and facts to testify to them before the responsible authorities. Immediately after the trial, Messrs. Ruli and Hoti wiped away their perspiration with relief, but on the Italian side Alberto Alessi reconfirmed once again his accusations against them, dispelling some of their mystery. "Genc Ruli was in Prague in June 1991 and from there traveled to Paris, where together with the two bankers, Saliu and Tartari, he signed Arsidi's authorization as negotiator."

This is a very serious accusation when one realizes that Ruli gave his signature five days before being appointed minister, thus without the right to do so. Nevertheless, there was still silence on the Albanian side until Albanian Television broadcast the president's approval of bank governor Hoti's resignation.

It is said that, at the first meeting held especially to deal with this matter, not only did Ilir Hoti not agree to tender his resignation, but the Executive Council refused to accept it.

However, President Berisha himself then intervened, and the miracle took place. Everybody agreed and signed the "resignation."

But why does this resignation occur at this particular time? Why right after a joint visit to the United States? We recall that the Arsidi scandal, over which the gentlemen are accused, took place precisely when Mr. Hoti was in the United States and after his return. This is

amazing when it is known that a corresponding bank of the Albanian State Bank, Credit Lyonnais, is also in the United States.

Appeals Court Orders Retrial of Ahmeti Case

*AU2610174093 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in
Albanian 1430 GMT 26 Oct 93*

[Text] Revision of the terms of investigation in the penal case against the accused [former Prime Minister] Vilsom Ahmeti, Agim Tartari, and Agron Saliu— this was the decision of the Court of Appeals delivered today at 1330 hours in Tirana.

As our correspondent Riza Derdiu reports, the prosecutor, Theodor Mosko, asked the panel of judges that the case be returned for investigation to the Tirana Prosecutor's Office. The chairman of the panel, Prenng Martini, read out the court's decision, which says, among other things, that the decision of the Tirana District Court was not properly based on the laws and the evidence, since the case was not based on full and comprehensive investigations.

The decision goes on to say that on the basis of the primary factor of justice, we see it as reasonable for the case to be returned for further investigations and to be judged comprehensively in order to have the truth come out in full. Therefore, on the basis of Article 4 of the Law on the Organization of Justice, the court decided to change the verdict of the Tirana District Court and ordered the case to be returned to the District Prosecutor's Office for further investigation.

Macedonian Demonstrators Jeer New U.S. Envoy*AU2710123193 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 27 Nov 93*

[Text] This morning President Zhelev received in succession the ambassadors of Algeria, Portugal, and the United States, and accepted their letters of accreditation.

We have learned from our reporter Silviya Velikova that before the ceremonial presentation of credentials a small group of supporters of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies gathered in front of the presidency building to protest against the appointment of Mr. Montgomery as the new U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria. Mr. Montgomery was greeted with catcalls when he arrived, but the protest did not develop into an incident.

Mr. William Montgomery is expected to give a news conference in about an hour's time.

Presidential Spokesman Comments*AU2710181693 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 27 Oct 93*

[Excerpts] On 26 October, President Zhelev received the credentials of the new U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, Mr. William Montgomery. [passage omitted]

After the ceremony, presidential spokesman Valentin Stoyanov made the following statement:

[Begin Stoyanov recording] After a thorough conversation with the new U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, Mr. Montgomery, President Zhelev believes that Bulgaria has a friend in the new U.S. ambassador. President Zhelev is convinced that during his term in Sofia, Mr. Montgomery will contribute to further developing friendly relations between the two countries. [end recording]

This was the official position of President Zhelyu Zhelev. [passage omitted]

President Zhelev later received the credentials of the ambassadors of Algeria and Portugal.

Cabinet, Supreme Court Reportedly 'Waging War'*AU2710180693 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 21 Oct 93 p 3*

[Article by Yonko Kalpazanov: "Severe Warning for Political Thugs"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers is waging a war with the Supreme Court. At least, this is what Professor Berov thinks. The Supreme Court, in its turn, treats the government in a condescending, conciliatory manner, rather like a soccer referee would treat an undisciplined and rough player, namely, by punishing him with the appropriate penalties prescribed in such cases.

Let us examine the first penalty: On 2 July 1993, the Supreme Court canceled the illegal decision of the Council of Ministers, on the basis of which the members of the government quota on the Supervisory Board of the Privatization Agency were dismissed. The Council of Ministers had forgotten to provide arguments for its action!

Instead of learning from their mistakes, as the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism had taught them, Mr. Berov and Deputy Prime Minister Karabashev became recurrent criminals by promptly dismissing the five members a second time. The organizational experience of former Komsomol member Karabashev found a fertile ground for its deployment.

The second penalty followed. Once again, the Supreme Court rescinded the Council of Ministers' resolution. Some kind of arguments were provided this time. Mr. Berov had fabricated them, after having diligently compiled his knowledge of Marxist theories. For the second time, the Council of Ministers grossly encroached upon the law, which precisely describes the conditions under which members of the Privatization Agency's Supervisory Board can be legally dismissed. Carried away by the wave of numerous dismissals on political grounds, intoxicated by their feeling of inviolability, dominated by the spell of hatred and desire for revenge, the prime minister and his fellow workers have totally lost every sense of elementary ethics that politicians should observe.

It is evident that privatization is the crossroad of many interests, such as the interests of powerful financial groups, trade union centers, ordinary Bulgarian citizens, foreign investors, and Bulgarian and foreign mafias. It is also evident that privatization is the focus for the selfish priorities of those political forces that are supporting Professor Berov and his cabinet. Last, but not least, it is evident that many of these interests are not coinciding with those of the Bulgarian people. It is obvious that such a situation is likely to provoke sharp struggles for power among the members of the Supervisory Board and the high echelons of the Privatization Agency itself. This is confirmed by the repeated illegal attempts of the Council of Ministers against the staff of the Privatization Agency's Supervisory Board, by the act of replacing the agency's executive director, and the subsequent purge in the agency's leadership, as well as by the successful efforts of establishing a personnel union between the agency and the banks.

What we cannot understand, however, is the government's unwillingness to look further than its nose and realize that besides all the crooks, there are some honest citizens still living in Bulgaria. There are people of independent spirit in our country whose moral standards are incompatible with those of the communist mafia, people whose behavior cannot be subject to the government's diktat. Such people are feeling obliged to serve public interests without trying to seek personal advantages. No matter how preposterous it may sound to the grandsons of our national "hero" Bay Ganyu [famous literary personage of the late 19th century, who symbolizes the Bulgarian petty bourgeois, characterized by gross manners, selfishness, and profiteering] there

are still naive, but decent citizens in our country who do not long for opulent banquets at Francophone gatherings [alluding to President Zhelev's recent trip to Mauritius where he attended a congress of French-speaking countries], for Mercedes, and for free-of-charge excursions to Mediterranean beaches. Those people are firmly resolved to oppose the planned criminal transactions, the incipient domination of the bankers [bankerizatsiya], and the government's demagogic mass privatization program, which merely serves as a cover for all sorts of shady deals.

The gentlemen ministers are incapable of shedding the totalitarian methods under which they were educated. "Such were the times" in the old days, but "the times have changed" now. Mr. Berov and his deputy, Mr. Karabashev, should take care because the next penalty on the soccer field may be the final one for them—a penalty that the angry Bulgarian people, rather than a referee, might inflict upon them!

VMRO-SMD Leader on Party Aims in Macedonia

AU2710210693 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
23-24 Oct 93 p 12

[Interview with Evgeni Ekov, general secretary of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies, by Konstantin Subchev; place and date not given: "The VMRO-SMD Takes New Realities Into Account"]

[Text] [Subchev] Mr. Ekov, is the new Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies [VMRO-SMD] like the "old" one?

[Ekov] It is, of course, not the old VMRO. Nevertheless, we should not forget that there was a very long break—from 1934 to 1990. The new times presuppose different forms of activity, forms imposed by the present political realities. Today, the VMRO-SMD totally adheres to legitimate and democratic positions and is developing its work in defending the Bulgarian national spirit in Macedonia precisely by these means. Even Ivan Mikhaylov, in his political testament written shortly before his death, admits that in the period before 1934, attempts on people's lives and other armed actions produced a stormy but short-term effect, whereas political declarations, memorandums, and other legal actions had a slower but more lasting effect.

[Subchev] What is the main task of the VMRO-SMD today, under the new realities that you have mentioned?

[Ekov] The organization aims to defend, preserve, and strengthen the Bulgarian national spirit in all parts of Macedonia. It can achieve this only through the economic, social, and cultural progress of all the Bulgarian people. Neither previously nor now has the VMRO ever regarded the Macedonian question as something divorced from all the problems facing the Bulgarian people.

[Subchev] How do you envisage implementing your end goal, while at the same time observing the principles of inviolability of borders?

[Ekov] The Great Macedonian Convention, held in May 1991, had the task of finding the new formula for the VMRO's present-day work. After long discussions and after reassessing the VMRO's political actions in the past, the convention reached the unanimous view that it is absurd to demand border changes today, at the end of the 20th century. Accordingly, our formula today is completely in the spirit of the new European principles, namely to seek the opening up of borders, not border changes. That which already exists as a fact in Western Europe, especially following Maastricht, must also be achieved in the Balkans. In this way, the Macedonian question will disappear, because everyone will have the right to define his nationality according to his feelings and will have full information about the state of affairs, both in the past and at present. Then, the consciousness of society—and hence national consciousness—will no longer be subjected to manipulation and the supply of biased and convenient information. The peoples of the three parts of Macedonia will enjoy free social communication between one another. It will be especially important to develop economic relations, to turn once again in the North-South direction, instead of seeking artificial ways of breaking traditional ties and directing economic relations in a direction convenient for someone's policy, as we are presently doing.

[Subchev] What is your attitude toward Greece's obstinate refusal to recognize the Republic of Macedonia under this name?

[Ekov] This is the position of an ostrich burying its head in the sand and believing that all the dangers are over. Greece is, in fact, attempting to halt the development of history, at a time when Sofia, for one reason, and Skopje, for another, have remained silent about the truth concerning the real nature of the Slavonic population in Aegean Macedonia. It is simply that Greece realizes that, once it has lost the monopoly over the name that it has won, it will immediately place a large question mark over the issue of the national affiliation of this population.

[Subchev] The first part of your party's name is the same as that of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] in the Republic of Macedonia. Are your aims also the same?

[Ekov] Our aims are basically identical, especially in the common struggle to win recognition for the Republic of Macedonia, guaranteeing peace in the region, and in supporting the forces working for the democratization of Macedonia, as a main condition for ensuring the right of self-determination for each citizen. Of course, our programs also contain differences, insofar as the VMRO-DPMNE does not want to be accused of being "elitists" [vurkhovisti]—the nickname given in Skopje to those who oppose the existence of the Macedonian nation.

[Subchev] Mr. Ekov, KONTINENT is the first Bulgarian newspaper to go on sale in Macedonia. What would you like to wish its readers?

[Ekov] I congratulate them on the anniversary of the VMRO's foundation [on 23 October 1893], and cannot resist the temptation to remind them of the words of the great Abraham Lincoln: "It is true that you may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; but you can't fool all of the people all the time."

Kozloduy Nuclear Plant Working at Reduced Output
AU2710112093 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Report by correspondent Veselin Angelov]

[Text] [Studio announcer] At the end of October, even though temperatures have already started to fall, the

Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is operating at reduced capacity. Our correspondent Veselin Angelov provides the details.

[Begin Angelov recording] At this time, reactors nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the old section of the nuclear plant are in operation, producing a total of 1,200 kilowatt-hours [unit of measurement as heard] of electric power—almost the same as one of the big reactor units nos. 5 and 6, which each have an output capacity of 1,000 Megawatts. These two units are now disconnected from the electricity grid and are due to start operation when temperatures fall below zero.

According to Mariya Stoyanova, spokesperson of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, according to the schedule the nos. 5 and 6 reactors will be connected to the grid around 15 November. [end recording]

Klaus Views NATO Entry as Long-Term Issue

LD2610214893 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in
Czech 1716 GMT 26 Oct 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondents Katerina Kasparova and Vaclav Musilek on 26 October; place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] You can now listen to the regular Tuesday interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, which has been prepared by Katerina Kasparova and Vaclav Musilek. [passage omitted]

[Kasparova] One of the most broadly discussed foreign political topics, during your absence, was our entry to NATO.

The communications media paid great attention to the meeting of defense ministers of the alliance in Trave-muende, which was addressed by the Americans, who proposed a peace partnership in the form of concluding treaties with non-member states. How does our republic understand this? Are we disappointed with the result of the meeting, or will we try to use this partnership as a true opportunity?

[Klaus] I repeat that all phenomena, as well as the entry of the Czech Republic to NATO, have their complicated temporal dimension and time sequencing. Something is a question of a short period of time, something is a question of a medium period of time, something is a question of a long period of time. If somebody, a politician or a journalist, confuses these phenomena and does not distinguish what is possible within a short, medium, or long period of time, and an impression is created that everything is a commotion of the present times, then I simply must say that it certainly is not a commotion of the present times. The idea that we could become a part of the integrated forces of NATO with one military commander and that our Army would become a part of this monolithic alliance is not a question of today, that is a short-term question, it is not a medium period question either, it is, at most, a long-term question. I definitely insist that all these things be strictly separated.

Of short-term nature, in particular, are statements of intent, but bilateral. Of medium-term nature are tasks of certain structuralization, phasing, certain approaches and so on, in any form. The actual bona fide and legal membership, with all that accompanies it, is merely the third question. So we lack unilateral and clear signals, adequate to us, from the other side. They come in various forms. I hope that the NATO summit in January will transpose them on a qualitatively new level and will give them a stronger substance.

As to medium-term, the form of this partnership must be found. Whether it is the idea proposed by the U.S., whether it is the idea of association of another type, whether it is membership of France's type of today—when France is a member, but not part of the united

command of troops—and so on—these are just variants that are not really key ones for this problem.

Let us keep it on this rational level. Let us not pack it in one parcel and let us not want to solve it today, on 26 October 1993. [passage omitted]

Havel on NATO Admission, War Compensation

AU2710125293 Prague CTK in English 1723 GMT
24 Oct 93

[Text] Prague Oct 24 (CTK)—In the question of NATO integration, much depends on how NATO's suggestions are meant and on their precise content, Czech President Vaclav Havel said today in his regular Sunday radio broadcast, Talks From Lany.

If they are meant as a half-way step to the Czech Republic's future membership, then there is no reason to cry, Havel said, adding that it would be worse if we took it to be a way of leaving everything as it is, as some way of satisfying us—an alternative to membership. This, he said, would be short-sighted of NATO and would show little understanding on the part of the alliance for the situation in the whole of Europe or for the importance of the rapid creation of a safety zone in Central Europe.

Turning to the issue of compensation for Czech victims of Nazism, Havel said that under both international and German law, the Czech Republic had no right to compensation. However, he said, it would continue to attempt to gain compensation, since it was one of the few countries which had not yet been given it.

German law did allow it to make some kind of gesture, which could lead to greater reconciliation without reflecting the past, Havel said. The Germans came up with the idea of making this kind of gesture... and from the beginning we understood it to mean that we would pay the victims first, from our funds, and then the sum would be compensated for by the German gesture. However, it now seemed as though complicated internal political developments in Germany were leading to the gesture being put off.

Havel also mentioned the joining of the issue of compensation of victims of Nazism to that of the compensation of Sudeten Germans, almost 3 million of whom were expelled from Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. We all know that the war came before the expulsion, he said, and therefore we believe that the German gesture of good will, a gesture of reconciliation... a humanitarian gesture is something we are entitled to ask for, he said. He stressed that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had never said that negotiating with the Sudeten Germans was an essential condition for anything.

On the subject of his recent visit to Poland, Havel described Polish President Lech Walesa as a man who sometimes made surprising speeches, but who had an

unusually keen political instinct. Havel was answering a question about how President Walesa saw Poland after the elections there.

He, Walesa, has already been through many difficult tests, and it was always clear at the end that he had made the right decision. He believes in himself as the guarantor of continuity of development in Poland. I definitely did not get the impression that he had fallen prey to any sort of panic or pessimism, Havel said.

Zieleniec Defines Foreign Policy Orientation

AU2810102093 Prague EKONOM in Czech No. 43
21-27 Oct 93 pp 15-17

[Interview with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec by Jiri Sekera and Eva Klvacova; place and date not given: "We Are a Land of Certainty"]

[Text] Foreign policy is the external portrayal of national identity and national interests, of ethical stances and the art of compromise, and of the ability to unite one's own interests with those of other countries. We discussed the nature of Czech foreign policy with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec.

[EKONOM] How would you define the concept of our foreign policy? We are a small country; we have been formed and deformed by past decades and centuries. Can such a country formulate an active foreign policy, or is it obliged to passively adapt itself to the superior forces on the international scene?

[Zieleniec] I do not think we just have to stand by passively and watch. After all, we have role models in many countries of a similar size and with similar traditions to our country—Austria, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. These are countries that are listened to on international forums, countries that are able to put forth their identity and values and also assert their interests. In the final analysis, foreign policy is not only about our being seen or heard somewhere. It must—first and foremost—state our interests. It is important for us to create an attractive international environment—an international political environment—for the complicated process of transformation what is underway in our country. We have to do this so that our contacts with foreign countries are more of a help than a hindrance to this process. That is the essence of our endeavor and I think the level of our foreign policy's visibility proceeds from this. We have to put forward the values on which our state is based so they are politically legible to our foreign partners and so what is going on here and what we are doing is obvious. This is how the issue of our foreign policy's visibility or invisibility should be understood. This is not an issue *sui generis*, but is one of the elements our foreign policy has at its disposal for asserting the aims I mentioned.

[EKONOM] How would you define our national values and national interests?

[Zieleniec] Undoubtedly, we have to create an attractive environment for the transformation taking place here. This transformation has been clearly defined. It involves the creation of a West European-type democratic society based on the market economy and private ownership. In the part of Europe we occupy, it is extremely important—from a geopolitical point of view—that we orient ourselves toward cooperation and integration with states that represent a similar type of society, that means West European states. The key strategy of our foreign policy, then, is to prepare the ground for our state's integration into West European institutions, the European Community, and also West European and other Western defensive institutions. This is also associated with the area we occupy and with our traditions. When I say that our foreign policy is—to a certain extent—associated with the values on which this state is based and if one of the key values is a democratic society founded on the freedom of the individual, then we also want to defend these values with those who share them. The straightforward nature of our, I would say, alliance orientation proceeds from this; this is not only a quest for our own security, but is an expression of our joint responsibility for common values. Finding our country's place in a region that, as you know, is not completely stable is another important element of our foreign policy orientation. The issue of getting on with our neighbors is a very practical one. First of all, our relations are advantageous, they are traditional, and the distances between us are smaller. It is extremely important for every country to get on well with its neighbors and cooperate with them. Finding our place in the region is also connected with other issues. Some of our neighbors—and I include Hungary among them, although this is a neighbor with whom we do not have a common border—have similar experiences from the communist era. That is—to a certain extent—we share similar post-communist societal problems. It is important for us to consult each other on these problems.

[EKONOM] You are talking about values we defend where we feel the obligation to share them with the international community. In foreign policy, however, a country's economic interests often come into conflict with the defense of moral, ethical, or ethical-political principles, human rights, freedom, and so on. You yourself often have to reconcile these two opposing points of view. How do you come to terms with this?

[Zieleniec] There is nothing extraordinary about this. This is not only a foreign policy issue. We each live our own lives, which, on the one hand, have a moral and existential dimension and, on the other hand, a material dimension. We reconcile these things every day, and every day we come to terms with the fact that our values tell us we have to do this, while our material dependence points our compass in a slightly different direction.

I see nothing extraordinary or contemptible in this, since—on the one hand—we are governed by the demands of recognized values and—on the other hand—by material considerations and we seek a path between

them. This is normal life. Of course, we must not succumb to extremes: We cannot lose sight of the values on which our society is based in return for mere material advantages and we would be naive to adhere to the moral aspects alone and thus lead this society into material disaster.

[EKONOM] Nevertheless, sometimes you are faced with delicate dilemmas....

[Zieleniec] Of course, we have problems. For example, this could be trade with Iran and Salman Rushdie's reception by the president. However, these two things are not at variance; the issue merely involves seeking a balance between them. Every state deals with them and every state finds a solution. We are learning more and more how to find this solution. The arms trade is a similar matter. I personally believe that manufacturing arms and selling them is not unethical, but it is possible to sell them wisely and foolishly. It is possible to sell them in a way that antagonizes our allies and it is possible to sell them in a way that does not antagonize our allies. These are practical problems that—I think—we are learning better and better to resolve. Look at the kind of discussions that took place about arms in 1990, and look now at how the issue has shifted onto a completely rational plane.

[EKONOM] A highly sensitive issue that exceeds the framework of foreign policy is the systematic revival of the Sudeten German question. It has a strong economic background and involves potential restitution and potential compensation. We know that in certain circles in Germany there are tendencies to reevaluate history and to make victims out of the culprits and culprits out of the victims. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Sudeten Germans fanatically supported Hitler's expansionism and effectively contributed to the occupation of our republic, which—apart from the human suffering—caused incalculable material damage. Now there is a desire for us to hold discussions along the lines of "you did something to us and we did something to you, so we are equally guilty." We think that our representatives are arguing very timidly in this regard and that they are not putting forward the obvious arguments. Why?

[Zieleniec] I am glad to answer you. I think it is necessary to say several important things. First, Czech-German relations are not Czech-Sudeten German relations. That is the first thing. Second, we will not overcome the past between us and the Sudeten Germans and between us and the Germans unless we forge substantial and open ties for the future. I would not like to shroud this issue in general phrases, but while there are far more people on our side of the border and on the German side of the border who see only the past than who positively assess cooperation, then our relations with Germany will always falter a little. It is terribly important to forge wide-ranging and open economic, cultural, and political cooperation with Germany. These are the starting points on which our policy should be based, and not just foreign

policy. Third, it is true—and you referred to this in your question—that Germany is returning to the logic of its history. This is not something we can change. The fact is that 50 years after the war and following the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR, geopolitical and historical tendencies are once again simply beginning to come to the fore in Germany. This is not something negative or tragic per se. We lived with such a Germany and such Germans for 1,000 years, but we speak Czech and we live on our own territory. Just as Germany is returning to the logic of its history, we are also returning to the logic of a history which—from this point of view—is not a chain of national defeats. We have to say this. We have negative experiences with regard to Germany, but we also have positive experiences; we have—as the current fashionable phrase expresses it—know-how in coexistence with Germans and with Germany. This is the basis for the certainty and self-confidence that we should have in our relations with Germany. We should definitely not commence a nationwide discussion on guilt and innocence or on claims and non claims following every statement by every Sudeten German.

[EKONOM] Unfortunately, some statements by our politicians have provided a stimulus for this...

[Zieleniec] Our position on this is clear; it is defined in the government's policy statement, in all the statements made by public constitutional officials, and in the programs of all the parties in our political spectrum. There is no reason to keep returning to this issue and opening it up. I would like to say that the Czech-German issue is, first and foremost, a Czech issue in the Czech lands and a German issue in Germany.

Until there is appropriate self-confidence stemming from our status and from our conviction about the kind of relationship we should have with Germany and until this becomes a firm element not only of the politicians' but also of the citizens' accoutrements, we will feel this nervousness. I also think we look too much at Bavaria and too little at the north. Then there are reactions from extreme aggression to humiliating servility, and these are the worst things we can do in our relations with Germany and Germans. I think it is up to us to clearly define our position; this applies to both citizens and politicians. A clear point of view can be the basis for constructive and far-reaching relations with Germany. I believe it is necessary to talk about these issues and not about guilt and innocence, that is, not argue about who did what terrible thing to whom, but instead look into the future and realize our own capabilities and the ability of the two nations to overcome this problem.

[EKONOM] You talk about national self-confidence. We are concerned that our nation did not have—and still does not have—the necessary self-confidence. This is borne out by the fact that it has always found role models, which—on the one hand—it admired and from whom it took culture and know-how, while—on the

other hand—it often suffered from a feeling of inadequate national identity. It sought its role models long ago in Germany, then—between the two world wars—in France, then it attached itself to the former USSR, and now, to a certain extent, it is becoming Americanized. What is your view of this—let us say—exaggerated adaptability?

[Zieleniec] I would polemicize with you a little, although we do not have the scope here to analyze our history and stances. I think, however, that your question simplifies the issue. I lived through—as you say—the period of attachment to the USSR, but I do not think this attachment had a nationwide dimension. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that we came through this period in a relatively good psychological state. We preserved our values and traditions, because we are now building our new society on nothing other than these very values and traditions, and I think we are succeeding in this.

[EKONOM] The priorities of our foreign policy are not only a matter for the foreign minister, they are set down in the government's program, agreements, and so on. Nevertheless, in what way has the appointment of an economist to the post of foreign minister influenced our foreign policy and its priorities?

[Zieleniec] There have been certain changes since the first period of post-November development. I would not say there has been a turnabout; you are all also aware that this has not happened. Incidentally, it is not good for a democratic state if fundamental changes are made in foreign policy when the government changes as this lowers the state's credibility. I have to keep the word given by my predecessor and my successor will have to keep the word I give. This is an elementary requirement ensuring that the state and nation enjoy respect abroad. Therefore, I have to take great care—for example—to ensure that foreign policy is consensual and that, to say the least, the government coalition—and, where possible, the democratic opposition parties—agree with the main objectives of our foreign policy. As far as I know, there is a consensus with regard to a substantial part of our activity and in these key areas. This is important. However, I should return to your question. There are no fundamental changes, but there are changes in emphasis—first, the state's far more straightforward western orientation and, second, our perception of regional cooperation and relations with our neighbors. We consider this to be a very important element of our foreign policy, a practically oriented element, but not as an alternative to our European fate.

[EKONOM] Our economic reform is incorporating us gradually into the community of developed market economies. How, in this context, do you view the progress to date of the transformation process?

[Zieleniec] The trade unions' chairman, Mr. Petrus, was here before you. I told him that perhaps it would be worthwhile—I do not know if I can do this—organizing an excursion at the state's expense by our trade unionists

to states undergoing similar reform—from the former GDR to Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, simply all of these post-communist states. I assured him that they would return from this excursion enthusiastic supporters of our government policy and economic reform. We have social peace and we do not have unemployment or a dramatic decline in our standard of living; these are key issues. Of course, the trade unionists have a more detailed magnifying glass. They say that unemployment here is low, but that in the Šumperk District it is 5.7 or 7.5 percent. They refer to this or that. However, we must realize that people are beginning to speak of us as a European tiger, as a country that grabbed hold of reform at the right end.

Of course, as an economist, I would take another magnifying glass and would begin to wonder whether this or that could not have been done a little differently or better in the past. The fact is, the state's foreign policy and prestige are not based on how skilled the minister or ambassador is, they are based on what we do at home, how convincing we are to the world, and what kind of successes we have achieved. The fact that I do not have to go around with an outstretched hand asking for loans and assistance is another dimension of our dignified foreign policy. Do not forget that Central and East Europe is a nightmare for the West; it is in a constant state of terror about what could happen there. We are an example of the fact that it works, that it is not an insoluble problem.

[EKONOM] One of the measures of our success or failure is—undoubtedly—the willingness of foreign investors to come to the Czech Republic. What is your opinion of the willingness and readiness of major foreign investors to involve themselves in our country? Is there not still a certain cautiousness and hesitancy among the most circumspect of them, for example, the Japanese?

[Zieleniec] The fact is that, after our revolution, most investments came from Germany, so much so that this aroused various considerations and fears. At that time—I was still a university teacher and government adviser—whenever I came into contact with western investors, I said: "Look, the Germans are investing because they know us better, because they know how to, and because they are close and we have been living next to each other for centuries. They are aware of the potential in this region and it is worth their while to invest and wait." I think more and more states and investors understand this logic, because the relative proportion of German investors is declining. The news that this is a region with great potential is spreading throughout the world and we will soon have a standard range of foreign investments from the point of view of the country of origin. The situation would be far worse if our neighbors, who know us best, did not invest, but investors from distant countries who do not know us invested here. The reciprocal proportion means that we are a land of certainty. Investors are beginning to realize this more and more. We also—as perhaps the only country in Central and East Europe—have not chosen the path of special advantages

for foreign investors. And, not despite, but because we have this normal kind of economy here, we have foreign investments. It is a dire illusion to think that policies to lure foreign investments and coercing the legal code will lead to foreign investments. As soon as a foreign investor sees something like this, he suspects that something is not right. Whoever comes for these enticements, wants his money back quickly. These are the ones who are not worth much in a normal economy.

[EKONOM] So, it is not by chance that those who came here in return for promises of special advantages are not conducting themselves well?

[Zieleniec] EKONOM said this, not the foreign minister.

Kalvoda Views Foreign Policy, Restitution

AU2810111793 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 19 Oct 93
pp 1, 9

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda by Robert Dengler; place and date not given: "Our Fuzzy Foreign Policy Should Be Given Clearer Contours"]

[Excerpt] [Dengler] What did you mean when you said that the government would soon be giving its opinion on the Sudeten German problem? Is the government going to say something different from what it is saying now?

[Kalvoda] I was not trying to say enigmatically that the government would hold a meeting on this subject. The Sudeten German problem is clearly described in the government's policy statement—which was approved by parliament—and in the government's foreign policy concept. Our fuzzy foreign policy, however, could lead to a situation where we would be forced to redefine this problem.

[Dengler] A few days after the foreign minister's speech you said that one of the principles that we want to stick to in our relations with Germany was: not to reopen matters that are already closed.

[Kalvoda] Minister Zieleniec's speech was in harmony with the said documents [the policy statement and the foreign policy concept], and I fully agree with him. I do not think that he went beyond certain limits, or that his speech was revolutionary. Well, it is good that he said what he did. By my statement I meant to say that the coalition will hold a broader debate on foreign policy, mechanisms that could help achieve foreign policy objectives, and certain business problems. It would be desirable if the speeches delivered abroad by our politicians were less fuzzy.

[Dengler] There was a closed-door debate at the end of January and beginning of February about the form of our dialogue with the Sudeten Germans. Nevertheless, the coalition launched an initiative after those Sudeten German days. How do you view the dispute as to whether a commission should be established or not?

[Kalvoda] I must say that this was one of the rare moments when I was grateful for the fact that RUDE PRAVO existed. I have been so much slurred in the press—they reported that I had said "yes", and then "no." RUDE PRAVO was the only paper that correctly recorded what I said at the meeting of the four coalition parties. It was a meeting at which it was suggested that a commission dealing with the Sudeten Germans should be established.

I said at that time that such a commission should seek a joint position for all the coalition parties—and that of the Czech Republic—on the Sudeten German issue. I also said that I would not mind if some members of the commission established contacts [with Sudeten Germans].

[Dengler] What is the situation today?

[Kalvoda] The commission's agenda should be agreed upon at a meeting of the coalition parties on foreign policy. Despite the fact that the Civic Democratic Alliance had been slurred in the press, it kept its original position on the matter, and did not appoint anyone to the group that should engage in direct dialogue. For the time being, there is no group preparing a joint stance for the coalition. In my opinion, we should have a mechanism, particularly at the Foreign Ministry, that would mobilize all the potential of the Czech Republic's state administration. Through such a mechanism we should be able to collect all the available information. We should handle the above problem as a problem between the Czech Republic and Germany, and not between the Czech Republic and the Sudeten Germans. My private opinion is that we are facing problems of the new Europe, of a new entity on its map—the reunited Germany. This country is seeking to find out what its priorities are in foreign policy. We cannot solve our problem by holding discussions with the Sudeten Germans.

[Dengler] Do you believe that the Civic Democratic Party can—irrespective of the will of the remaining three parties in the coalition—reach agreement on the restitution of church property?

[Kalvoda] The Civic Democratic Party and the rest of the coalition do not stand against each another. The Civic Democratic Alliance's position has been misinterpreted. Maybe it is the Alliance's own fault. Its position is substantially different from the position of the Christian parties. In particular, the Alliance does not believe that justice can be done if some property is restituted and some is not. I admit that the role of the churches is much more important than the role of the horticulturists, but, for the sake of justice, churches cannot be exempted from the general restitution rules. I have always tried to make the coalition partners skip this phase of the discussion and try to reach a conclusion as to what property the churches should receive—and not what part of their property should be restituted. We have to avoid ideologically irreconcilable assumptions. Unfortunately, we are

still using arguments, such as, "What has been stolen should be returned." I do not believe that this is a sensible basis for an agreement.

[Dengler] Who is going to tell us what the churches should receive?

[Kalvoda] I do not believe that an agreement between the state and the churches should constitute a basis for ownership. The state has powers—and it has to be so. The churches are not an equal partner to the state. We invite the churches for a discussion only when we want to have an idea what historical property they claim as theirs. Using this information, we will draft documents that we will use during coalition talks. On the basis of these documents we will sign an agreement. There is no equal partnership, and no equality between the state and the church. When the state was setting up the restitution laws, which still only provide for partial compensation for injustice, it did not have to sign agreements with special interest groups.

[Dengler] The Civic Democratic Alliance held separate talks with the Christian Democratic Party. According to Vaclav Benda, you did not issue a joint declaration....

[Kalvoda] I cannot deny that we informally contacted the Christian Democratic Party. However, we did not officially assign any members of the Civic Democratic Alliance to hold talks with them. Recently, I have spoken with Mr. Lux about what could be done to achieve progress in church property restitution. However, this is not what I would consider to be separate talks between parties within the coalition. [passage omitted]

Civic Democratic Party Still Leads Opinion Polls

LD2610144093 Prague CTK in English 1359 GMT
26 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 26 (CTK)—The Civic Democratic Party is mostly supported by younger people with higher

education, a poll conducted in early October by the Institute for Research of the Public Opinion (IVVM) revealed.

The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) is mainly supported by people over 60, while the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) has most followers in large cities, the poll showed.

Voting Preferences Between June and October
[in percent]

	June	July	September	October
Civic Democratic Party	29	26	32	31
Czech Social Democratic Party	13	13	13	13
Civic Democratic Alliance	11	8	8	8
Left Bloc Mostly Communist	8	7	7	6
Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party	4	6	4	4
Liberal Social Union	4	4	3	4
Assembly for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party	4	3	4	3
Christian Democratic Party	1	1	2	2
Self-Governing Democracy Movement for Moravia and Silesia	1	2	1	2
Free Democrats (Civic Movement)	1	2	2	1
Movement of Pensioners for a Secure Life	1	1	1	0
Others	4	3	4	3
Not known, or not stated	19	24	19	23

The sample was 748 people over 18.

Kovac Fails To Announce New Government Composition

LD2710114793 Prague CTK in English 1029 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Bratislava, Oct 27 (CTK)—Slovak President Michal Kovac did not announce the composition of the Slovak government coalition in parliament today, as had been expected.

The chairmen of the coalition parties have not submitted their proposal regarding the new government members, but I expect this to happen in the next few days, Kovac told the parliament.

The governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) concluded a new coalition last week, thus ending a several-month period of the HZDS minority government.

The fact that the proposals have not been presented suggests some problems the SNS and HZDS are facing in the creation of the new cabinet.

Parliamentary observers were amazed at the absence of Premier Vladimir Meciar during Kovac's address.

Meciar on Forming of HZDS-SNS Coalition

AU2710144993 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Oct 93 p 2

[Report by "giv": "Who Is To Blame for the Bad Image"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava— Asked about the formation of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]-Slovak National Party [SNS] coalition in an interview broadcast in Slovak Radio's Radio Journal program yesterday evening, Prime Minister Meciar replied that the choice of allies was very limited. The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] rejected the offer [to form a coalition government with the HZDS] and the other parliamentary parties did not show interest either.

This alliance will make it possible for laws to be passed in Slovak parliament and, at the same time, the two coalition partners will in this way acknowledge their responsibility for Slovakia's independence, for which they had voted. Replying to the objection that the two coalition partners did not have any pendants on the European political scene, Vladimir Meciar said that the SNS had manifested its interest in joining the European Democratic Union [EDU], while the HZDS had been offered EDU membership several times. "We shall transfer our contacts and offers to the SNS and will help it become internationally accepted," Vladimir Meciar said. [passage omitted]

Commenting on the Slovak National Bank's step to exchange [stamped 1,000 koruna] banknotes, the prime minister said, among other things: "It was the last, almost desperate attempt to prevent the worst. Had we

not taken this step, 1,000-koruna banknotes might have turned into worthless symbols in people's hands."

"Before the elections, we promised people sweat and tears," Vladimir Meciar said in reply to a question about the [HZDS's] decline in popularity polls. "But the mistake also lies in the fact that little is known about the government's positive steps. When we trip somewhere, everyone knows about it. Someone is to blame for the permanent creation of a bad image and this influences citizens' views," Vladimir Meciar added.

In one section of the interview, heralded in the Slovak Radio's Radio Journal program at noon, there was also talk about the Bratislava City Court's rejection of the legal complaint filed by [Culture Minister] Dusan Slobodnik against [poet] Lubomir Feldek. "The view of a city court or a district court on what constitutes a fascist past can be changed by a higher court and a person must be judged in all aspects," Vladimir Meciar said. "What really matters, however, is that it has been demonstrated that the government does not influence the activity of courts. Once the case is concluded, it will have to be dealt with by the minister-prime minister-president triangle."

Meciar Interviewed on Budget Deficit

LD2710150293 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Vlado Meciar by reporter Anna Samelova; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Samelova] Will the budget be balanced or will there be a deficit?

[Meciar] First of all, this budget envisages a 16 billion koruna deficit. This deficit should not be used for social purposes. The funds gained through the deficit must be earmarked for structural changes to the economy. This means that these funds should be earmarked for investments into power generation, transport, and regional and administrative areas. Hence, the budget deficit cannot be lost on food, it has to be invested wisely.

As for the overall philosophy of the state budget, it is based on zero growth. This means that the economic decline will stop in 1994. It is expected that there will be zero growth and no decline. It also means that due to the current trend, the decline will continue for part of 1994. At the same time, the government has pledged to achieve a zero result by the end of 1994; thus the government has pledged to stop the decline and to stabilize the growth of economy. This is an exceptionally important thing.

Another area, which could be interesting for the listeners, is the expected growth in unemployment. The original budget variants envisaged a 20 percent unemployment ceiling. We have lowered this and we have issued a directive saying that the ceiling cannot go above 17 percent. [passage omitted]

[Samelova] Individual ministries have presented their financial requirements which go well above the limits you have stipulated. How are you going to deal with the requirements of individual ministries in the budget?

[Meciar] The government has approved the macro-economic objectives for the whole republic. They are still to be approved by parliament. There is a contradiction between these objectives and the requirements of individual ministries which are asking for double funds. Talks need to be held between the Finance Ministry, which is now aware of the budget, and individual ministries which will have to go down to 50 percent of what they need. Of course, some sectors will be considered a priority, one of them being defense, for example. [passage omitted]

[Samelova] [Passage omitted] Do you believe that we will not have to pay for the budget proposed by the government with the unwanted triggering of an inflation spiral?

[Meciar] We do envisage some inflation in 1994. Its growth, however, should be 1 percent per month. Thus, inflation should not exceed 12 percent for the whole year [as heard]. [passage omitted]

Weiss Comments on HZDS-SNS Coalition

*AU2710151693 Prague CTK in English 1801 GMT
24 Oct 93*

[Text] Bratislava, OCT 24 (CTK)—The Democratic Left Party (SDL) does not see the newly-made coalition between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) as a failure on its part, because it had not wanted to enter a coalition with the HZDS. SDL chairman Peter Weiss said today in a Slovak Television debate.

Weiss said he believed that any platform of opinion on which the HZDS and the SDL could have created a coalition had gradually become lost. We have a different opinion on how to solve the present internal crisis. We do not like the tendency towards the governing of the state administration by one movement, we have different opinions on how the councils of public institutions such as Slovak Television, should be formed, we have different opinions on privatization and we have not agreed on social welfare policy. This means that a coalition is out of the question for us, because we have rejected the philosophy of being connected to the HZDS and its present policies, Weiss said.

The recent emergence of the present coalition was a normal and natural way of solving Slovakia's internal political crisis, he said. However, people would ask themselves how two political parties could join together who only this summer had been so antagonistic. As far as Slovakia's reputation in the West was concerned, said Weiss, western countries put all parties founded on national lines under the microscope. He drew attention to an article in the Viennese paper DER STANDARD,

which reported that three weeks ago, Slovak Premier and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar had said HZDS was a guarantee that the nationalists would stay out of the government.

In reaction to this, honorary chairman of the SNS Jozef Prokes hotly denied that the SNS was a nationalist party. He also rejected the claim that SNS and HZDS had been antagonists. They had individual disputes, he said, but then they had agreed on a program and had found a way towards each other.

HZDS secretary Olga Keltosova reacted to Weiss' statement on the television debate by saying that HZDS had not considered forming a coalition with the SDL, not because the SDL had rejected the HZDS' program, but because the HZDS had decided that it was too early to go into a coalition with a post-communist party, for the very reason of Slovakia's reputation abroad.

Nuclear Energy Agreement Signed With Russia

*AU2710204193 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak
23 Oct 93 p 1*

[TA SR report: "Russia Takes Over Commitments; What To Do With Radioactive Waste?"]

[Text] Bratislava—Approximately 55 percent of electricity in Slovakia is generated by the Jaslovské Bohunice nuclear power plant. For the time being, spent fuel is being stored in an intermediary nuclear fuel depository located on the power plant's premises.

Imrich Szitas, director of the [Slovak Economy Ministry's] section for basic branches, said that the embassy of the Russian Federation in the Slovak Republic has declared itself the successor state to the agreements concluded between the former USSR and the former CSSR regarding cooperation in the construction of nuclear power stations. Those agreements contain, among other things, the commitment to take over spent nuclear fuel from these power stations.

In view of these facts, the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic have signed the "Agreement on Cooperation in the Sphere of Nuclear Energy." The "Agreement on Cooperation in the Sphere of Transporting Nuclear Fuel Across the Territory of Ukraine" was signed simultaneously by the Governments of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Slovak Republic.

World Bank Director: Social Policy 'Too Generous'

*AU2710172693 Prague CTK in English 1609 GMT
24 Oct 93*

[Text] Bratislava Oct 24 (CTK)—The Slovak Republic's social policy is too generous, World Bank executive director Bernard Snoy told journalists here yesterday, adding that the system of distributing social spending should be changed.

Snoy, in charge of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and another four European Countries, is a member of the eight-men delegation of the World Bank executive directors who started a three-day visit to Slovakia on 21 October.

Slovak Television reported that the delegation recommended that Slovak representatives revise the structure of the social welfare system.

Social welfare expenditures constitute 25 percent of the gross national product and the World Bank recommends that they be targeted at those who really need them. Snoy said this would help stabilize the budget as there would be more resources for areas which could support economic development.

The delegation met with Slovak President Michal Kovac, Premier Vladimir Meciar, economics ministers and trade union representatives. The main topics taken up in discussions were the infrastructure, the pace of privatization, reform of the financial sector and social welfare.

The delegation said it primarily aimed to map the state of the economic and social areas in Slovakia in the ten months that had elapsed after former Czechoslovakia divided into two states in January 1993 (Slovakia and the Czech Republic).

They said they did not seek to negotiate specific credits. At the press conference, however, they did not rule out

that the results of their mission to Slovakia, yet to be thoroughly examined, might influence the granting of future credits.

Oil Leak Causes 'Worst' Pollution Ever in Republic

*AU2710131093 Prague CTK in English 1054 GMT
22 Oct 93*

[Text] Bratislava, Oct 22 (CTK)— Environment protectors and soldiers are trying to remove 50 tonnes of diesel from the Uh River in east Slovakia.

The pollution, caused by a leak from an oil pipeline in Ukraine, is thought to be the worst which has ever hit Slovakia.

The accident, whose causes are not yet known, happened on Tuesday [19 October] night about 15 km from Uzhgorod, where the oil flowed into one of the Uh's tributaries. Ukraine, however, only officially informed Slovakia about the accident on Wednesday evening.

Valent Kozuch, director of the Povodi Bodrogu a Hornadu plant in Michalovce said that luckily his employees were alerted to the accident by people they knew in Ukraine. We were able to catch the pollution in relatively good time, he said in an interview in the daily PRAVDA today.

The paper reports that the immediate cleaning of the river will last a week, while cleaning the banks will last until the end of the year at least. No-one has yet dared to estimate the damage done.

Antall Recovery Reportedly 'Sooner Than Expected'

AU2710162293 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Oct 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Doctors Are Satisfied With Jozsef Antall's State of Health"]

[Text] The prime minister's press office has published the latest report on Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's state of health. As is known, on 14 October, an autologous parent cell transplantation was carried out on Antall, who has been receiving treatment at the Cologne University Hospital's No. 1. Medical Clinic since 6 October for a non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.

Professor Volker Diehl, director of the clinic and leader of the medical team treating Antall, said the following on 25 October: "The doctors are satisfied with the results of the treatment so far, and the therapy is going according to schedule. The parent cells have started to produce blood cells again, and there have been no complications. Considering the circumstances, the prime minister's condition is satisfactory. The next medical report can be expected in a week's time."

According to NEPSZABADSAG's information received from persons familiar with the course of the treatment, the improvement of Antall's condition is somewhat sooner than expected. Accordingly, conditional preparations for Antall's return journey to Hungary have begun, which might be possible before the middle of November. The implementation of this plan naturally depends on the patient's condition. The prime minister's safety is protected by the republic's Guard Regiment in Cologne in shifts. Antall is following domestic events with keen interest. He has several telephone conversations with deputizing Interior Minister Peter Boross and other government officials. The prime minister "meets" the Hungarian press twice a day. He receives a detailed press review in the morning and reads the newspapers arriving from Budapest at midday. The newspapers, just as all other objects Antall comes in contact with, are sterilized.

Interior Minister Views Government Performance

AU2710215293 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 25 Oct 93 p 4

[Interview with Interior Minister Peter Boross by Attila Gy. Fekete in Budapest on 23 October: "Boross in Favor of More Marked Central Power"]

[Text] Interior Minister Peter Boross, who is substituting for the prime minister, gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG at the commemoration [of 23 October 1956] in the Interior Ministry.

[Fekete] You have been a member of the first freely elected government from the very beginning. Three and a half years have passed—can you please assess the performance of the Antall government?

[Boross] It is natural that, with the approach of the elections, the parties that will run in next year's contest as our opponents mainly emphasize the negative aspects of the government's work. I do not think that any political force would have done any better than we have, even if we take our mistakes into account.

[Fekete] Assessing the government's policy in the past three years, what would you do differently?

[Boross] In the initial period, the Hungarian Government acted in accordance with European norms. Now, I have to say that we also accepted norms on certain issues that we should have only accepted in five to eight years' time and not in the transitional period. It would have appeared to be more logical and rational, although politically perhaps less defensible, if the governmental control had been stronger in the transition and the central power had played a more marked role.

[Fekete] The young people of Budapest in 1956 and in 1993 are equally dissatisfied with the government, although for different reasons. What do you think the reason for this is?

[Boross] The country expected the change of regime to be a miracle, and people are asking with increasing impatience why prosperity is not coming when we have a multiparty system and a freely elected government. It is natural for the youth to be dissatisfied. The same also applies to those who lived with their own dissatisfaction and hopes for decades. They envisioned what the world would be like after the Soviet troops leave and communism fails—but the world has not fulfilled their dreams because it could not have. We must understand the disappointed people, even if they sometimes use extreme expressions.

[Fekete] The implementation of the Law on the Administration of Justice will coincide with the election campaign. Through this, will the provision of justice perhaps be able to influence the outcome of the elections?

[Boross] In my view, the issue of the provision of justice should have been settled as early as in 1990. Nevertheless, it is still not too late. This law had to be drawn up because the nation cannot forgive its mass murderers. However, the significance of this for the elections will be negligible because the electors assess the parties on the basis of their economic programs.

[Fekete] In Bekescsaba, you suggested that local elections be postponed. Later, however, even a number of the leaders of your party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, distanced themselves from your suggestion....

[Boross] In my view, considering the preparations of the election staff, it would do no harm if the local representative bodies were reelected in 1995. It might also have a more beneficial effect on public affairs if the two elections are not held in the same year. This is my personal view.

Minister Expects End to Declining Exports

LD2710150093 Budapest MTI in English 1311 GMT
27 Oct 93

[Text] Budapest, October 27 (MTI)—Due to the government's export promotion scheme, the decline in Hungary's sales abroad will likely halt, Hungarian Minister of International Economic Relations Bela Kadar told reporters on Wednesday.

In the first nine months of 1993, Hungary's exports decreased by 24 per cent, while its imports increased by 4.7 per cent as compared to the similar period last year. In terms of value, exports amounted to USD 6.063 billion, and imports to USD 8.511 billion in the period under survey. The foreign trade deficit, based on customs statistics, stood at USD 2.448 billion in late September, while the deficit affecting the balance of payments was lower, at USD 1.819 billion.

Sales to eastern Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union dropped by 12-13 per cent, and those to the advanced states by 29 per cent as compared to the corresponding period of 1992. The decline was due to a 36 per cent drop in agricultural production and a 33 per cent decline in consumer goods export.

Within total exports, deliveries of industrial products declined by 20 per cent, with exports of machines and installations remaining at the 1992 level.

Over the first nine months, foreign working capital valued at USD 1 billion was invested in the country, bringing the total amount invested in Hungary over the past years to USD 5.8 billion. The amount is expected to reach USD 6 billion by the end of the year.

Slovakia Has Different Views on Gabcikovo

LD2610145993 Prague CTK in English 1159 GMT
26 Oct 93

[Text] Budapest, Oct 26 (CTK)—The views of Hungary and Slovakia on the controversial temporary water regime on the Danube at Gabcikovo still diametrically differ. Gyorgy Tatar says in an interview published by the Budapest daily "MAGYAR HIRLAP" today.

Tatar, the Hungarian Government commissioner for the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros waterworks situated on the Hungarian-Slovak border, says that it cannot be ruled out that Bratislava and Budapest will be unable to reach a compromise solution.

Introduction of the temporary water regime has been ordered by an agreement concluded by the two countries under the aegis of the European Community (EC) in early April, when they submitted the Gabcikovo affair to the Hague-based International Court of Justice.

Slovakia and Hungary have different ideas of the necessary irrigation of the small Rye Isle region on the Danube's right bank (which lacks water due to the unilateral diversion of the part of the river's main stream

onto the Slovak territory in October 1992). Slovakia suggests to raise the Danube's level through dams, while Hungary insists that some water be returned from the Slovak derivation canal into the river's main bed.

Tatar said that a solution was sought by a commission of experts, which also included experts from the EC. However, the negotiations cannot be protracted for ever, as it is impossible for the small Rye Isle to be deprived of water in the next growing season, he added.

Russians Allegedly Buy Digep Cannon Factory

AU2710153993 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in
Hungarian 25 Oct 93 pp 1, 9

[Report by Pal Molnar: "Has the Armament Factory's Privatization Backfired?—The Targeted Cannon Factory"]

[Text] Have people missed the target of privatization at the Digep cannon factory in Diosgyor? This is one of the questions being asked in the crossfire on the privatization process. The cannon factory that struggled in the past without orders for months finally found a buyer in 1993. This deal, however, has also recently become a target of criticism.

According to one view, the armament factory has been acquired by Russians. Although in the summer, it was bought by a Hungarian company, the Army Co-Op. Ltd. Their employees are no longer allowed to enter the factory. Factory Director Jozsef Bernath, an employee of the Army Co-Op. Ltd., is not aware of this. He provided inside information on the factory, saying that production is in process and people are working in one or two shifts. However, he directed further inquirers to the company's center in Budapest.

In the Army Co-Op's Budapest office, Sandor Veres, a leading worker of the company, said that they would not be able to control production if they were not able to enter the factory. He said that it has not yet been decided if they want to react to the press assumptions published in the KAPE [CASH] specialized publication.

According to the statements, the Arigon Company, which is registered in London, acquired the armament factory from the Army Co-Op by raising the capital several times because the Hungarian company did not have enough money for the factory.

Dezso Sugar, general director of the Reorg. Inc. that carried out the cannon factory's sale, said that the London company is a legally registered company and has already appeared in Hungary through a 1 billion forint [Ft] investment in Csepel. It is possible that the businessmen of the company speak Russian, but this has no significance. They could be speaking other languages as well.

It is a fact, however, that the cannon factory that operated as part of the Digep has been advertised a

number of times, but has not been sold. It was finally sold to the Army Co-Op—the only applicant—and was duly paid for. One of the conditions was that the 452 people who were working there would continue to be employed for at least another six months. According to Sandor Veres, the new owner is fulfilling this condition.

Because of the cannon factory deal, the country directorate of the National Savings Bank [OTP] has also been charged. Newspaper articles claimed that the bank gave a "strange" loan for the purchase of the factory because the guarantee of the loans seems to be "weak." This statement seems to be controversial because, according to the same newspaper, the Borsod County OTP Directorate has overinsured itself many times. County Director Laszlo Nagy calls special attention to the fact that every single loan is awarded on the basis of a "censorship" committee's decision. This body thoroughly scrutinizes the repayment possibilities. As a matter of fact, the bank is trying to help the privatization program and people's employment through financial maneuvers. He will not, however, comment on the armament factory deal because the details are considered bank secrets.

The Diosgyor factory has also been accused because "mysterious Russian businessmen" can even carry out armament export by selling the factory's products. Laszlo Kocsis, head of a main department at the Ministry of International Economic Relations, firmly states that this is impossible. According to a 1991 government decree that regulates the foreign sale of military technology equipment, an activity permit is needed in this area, even for foreign trade. Those who have this can ask for a special negotiating permission for the sale of the manufactured weapons. After they have this and have completed the negotiations, the enterprise must ask for a permit to make a contract. When it has this, the relevant

committee can still halt the sale due to changed circumstances. This committee consists of six ministers; the high level of the decision is justified precisely by the delicate nature of armament deals.

Laszlo Kocsis, as secretary of the aforementioned inter-ministry committee, should have been aware if the Diosgyor factory had received Ft400 million of "export development aid." There is a trade development fund, and even armament manufacturers can receive money from this after submitting a detailed application, but according to his knowledge, no such application has been received from Diosgyor.

Lajos Erdelyi, spokesman for the Defense Ministry, is also not aware of the fact that the ministry intends to give a 1 billion forints of a so-called "production advance" to the Diosgyor factory. This factory does not belong to the group of factories that is considered by the government in respect of weapon manufacturing. The amount itself is unrealistically high considering the ministry's current means.

The Ft650 million that is expected by the cannon factory from the National Technical Development Committee [OMFB] is also a huge amount. Ferenc Rudan, a leading member participating in awarding the development aids, considers this sum as huge compared to the OMFB's resources, and he is not aware of any applications having arrived for this.

By way of setting this issue into a historical process, Sandor Veres, a member of the Army Co-Op, said that worse things than this have been written in Miskolc newspapers before. For example, bombs supposedly found in forests served as sensations at the time....

To shoot at the cannon factory's privatization with symbolic shrapnel can certainly be advantageous from a certain point of view. Some shells will certainly hit flesh, and the wounds cause excitement in today's world that is hungry for these.

First Council of Ministers Meeting Held

LD2710151093 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] The first meeting of Waldemar Pawlak's government has taken place at the Office of the Council of Ministers. The meeting was of a technical and organizational nature and was held according to the rules contained in the Constitution; that is, only the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and ministers had to take part.

After the meeting Prime Minister Pawlak announced that the government would decide on the fate of the 55 bills submitted to the Sejm by Hanna Suchocka's cabinet by the end of this week.

The Council of Ministers also decided that the deadline of 30 October for city mayors to sign agreements with voivodas concerning the transfer of power from the government to the local administration should be extended to 20 December.

Pawlak Sees No Controversy Over NATO Application

LD2710151793 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0613 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by unidentified reporter in the "Signals of the Day" program; in the studio on 27 October—live or recorded]

[Text] [Passage indistinct] [Reporter] Prime minister, I am looking at my watch and I see that your visit and our conversation is coming to an end. Let us depart for a moment from Polish affairs. How do you see the issue of Poland joining NATO and relations between Poland and Russia, which recently provided much food for thought, to put it mildly.

[Pawlak] First of all, as far as foreign policy is concerned, a wise continuation is needed in this sphere as is the development of foreign policy in the direction of turning political contacts into economic contacts. We need multilateral cooperation, in all directions, both with the East and with the West.

I think that with wise decisions there should be neither anxiety nor controversy concerning Poland's entry into NATO. One can see that in the economic domain we are in the sphere of western influence, while in the military domain we are standing in the draught and our expectations and our proposals are, I suppose, natural and clear, both to NATO and to Russia. The question is to negotiate an agreement which can be accepted both by the West and by the East. They have their own proposals and assessment of the situation and they expect solutions safeguarding security for many years to come.

Views Beginning of Term

LD2710223793 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2025 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by announcer Janusz Pichlak; place and date not given—live or recorded; relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[Excerpts] [Pichlak] Good evening. The guest of TV Polonia today is Prime Minister of the Polish Republic Waldemar Pawlak. We greet you very sincerely. I would like to ask at the start how you feel after the first day in office in the Polish Republic.

[Pawlak] Today was above all an organizational day. We established the whole procedure for settling down into the affairs of ministries and taking over offices. [passage omitted]

[Pichlak] Was there anything particular today, at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers, to which attention should be drawn?

[Pawlak] We established the procedure for addressing the Report on the Condition of the State, specifying which matters are important and which matters must be quickly undertaken within particular ministries. And ministers will now be looking at this in their own ministries. I think that by the end of the week we will already have a full review of matters and an efficient functioning of the entire Council of Ministers, quite simply every minister will be working fully in his own ministry.

[Pichlak] The British say: First things first, the most important things first. So what are these most important, priority matters for Poland?

[Pawlak] As regards general matters which are important from Poland's point of view, then above all is stressing the strategy of Poland's development. And on development through the growth of exports, and thus an export favoring strategy, such that Polish goods will find markets abroad. And parallel to this, measures and work for demand to rise on the domestic market, for production to be able to increase and the people to have work, have incomes, have the opportunity to earn, so that everyone be able to say in a year or two that he lives better than a year before.

[Pichlak] The announced withdrawal of the draft laws of the previous government that were presented to parliament earlier—why?

[Pawlak] You probably understand that this is natural, because the previous government worked on many draft laws while the Sejm was suspended. It undertook a series of measures that were based on decisions of the Council of Ministers or of particular ministers, and laid over 50 laws before the Sejm in its last days in office. We quite simply wish to thoroughly review these draft laws, check which of these laws should be undertaken as a matter of urgency and should be given quick passage through the

Sejm. The point is quite simply for the new ministers to be able to address these matters, and also to draw attention to those laws in which changes or supplements or amendments are necessary. This is so that we will not lose time later in the Sejm.

As is known, the Sejm will meet around 8 November, and we wish to devote this time for the Council of Ministers to be able to make the appropriate amendments over this time, and evaluate these laws in terms of urgency and the rate at which work will be carried on in the Sejm.

[Pichlak] But of these several dozen, or more than 50, which are the most important to verify?

[Pawlak] As I said, this is at present a task for all the ministers. And toward the end of this week, at the start of next week, I will have a better idea of the opinions of the entire composition of the Council of Ministers on all of these laws.

[Pichlak] Must the new draft budget be subject to change—15 November is on the whole an impossible deadline?

[Pawlak] This would be a difficult deadline, but well. I think that we will be concerned to bring about the presentation of the budget for next year by the end of this year.

[Pichlak] Will there be immediate changes, a frequently recurring question, of deputy ministers, voivodas, the chairmen of state television?

[Pawlak] Well, this is what journalists would like most of all. I think that this would surely be a very lively process from the point of view of the press, or the mass media, but we fairly clearly specified these matters in the coalition agreement. Our concern is to create an administration that is competent and responsible and we are not going to make changes for changes sake, but will make changes for the better. [passage omitted]

[Pichlak] Are you in favor of administrative reform? This question too has been sent by one of our viewers from France. Are you for the administrative reform of the country, for the creation of districts [powiaty]?

[Pawlak] In general, I wish to draw attention to the fact that recently the fundamental weakness of the state was the weak effectiveness of state structures, especially the administrative structures, those associated with finance and with taxation, with excise. And in this sense we are concerned with making the administration efficient.

As regards structural changes then, they should take place at a pace which it is possible to finance. That is the first thing. Second, they should be justified from the point of view of the effectiveness of these changes. At the moment, the introduction of districts into the present structure of voivodships rather misses the point. These should be linked processes, the creation of districts and the creation of new voivodships. In my opinion, we will

be considering this matter very carefully, whether this is possible by next year, or whether these changes will have to be deferred somewhat so as to prepare them better.

France happens to be a good example, for there too attempts at administrative reform were made, and from what we know certain changes were abandoned for purely economic reasons. It transpired that the costs of carrying out structural changes were rather too great relative to the benefits that are attained. Here we should rather look at whether the structures that exist at present thoroughly fulfill their tasks or whether they are too inefficient. [passage omitted]

That is, we wish to concentrate on the solution of specific problems, and not on constant reorganization.

[Pichlak] Yes, prime minister, but it is also done in order to strengthen one's own power, putting one's own people into place.

[Pawlak] I think that the experiences of the last few years in Poland show that the arrangement of people in structures is not the best key for a long-lasting administration of power. It is, rather, appropriate to concentrate on the solution of problems that are important for society, because in democratic societies people every now and then very severely judge authorities who concern themselves with their own people in structures and do not concern themselves with society and the state.

[Pichlak] In this specific instance, is there agreement between both ruling parties forming the government?

[Pawlak] You are thinking about administration and the principles for the creation or shaping of personnel in the administration? Yes. This matter was specified in the coalition agreement, and there we say that the main criterion is the criterion of competence, and we will equally severely apply it toward those who belong to the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] or the Democratic Left Alliance, as to those who belong to other parties or are not associated with any party.

[Pichlak] This is nevertheless a coalition government. Can one say that there is a natural contradiction of interests between both ruling parties?

[Pawlak] I do not believe it is necessary to look for contradictions right away, at the start. Rather, we should concentrate on seeking that which unites us. [passage omitted]

[Pichlak] Prime Minister, after your nomination, or before, right after the elections, you visited the bishops. Was this in order to create a new image of the PSL, as a peasant-Christian party? What was the purpose?

[Pawlak] I also visited the bishops earlier. I think that, well, we can allow ourselves some degree of freedom. And I do not believe that this was any sort of problem, or some exceptional phenomenon. The church has a very important role in Poland's life, and the church has fulfilled a very important role in the previous period. We

remember this and we value this, and I think that this is necessary, in this sphere of affairs where there are mutual problems, joint action for the resolution of troubles, matters, and cooperation is desirable to the maximum degree.

[Pichlak] Does this cooperation also signify a stand which is convergent with that of the church on the matter of abortion?

[Pawlak] I think that cooperation does not mean that we agree on all matters. Things run variously in political arrangements, and as is known the PSL parliamentary club did not adopt a political stand on this matter, acknowledging this to be a matter of individual conscience for every deputy. And that is how we approach politics, that in the sphere of faith, confession, we seek that which unites, we seek cooperation, and we do not intend to make politics out of this field. Rather we should seek solutions that unite and not those that divide society or the nation.

[Pichlak] Since we are speaking about relations with the church, the fact that after the swearing-in, the oath taken before the president, four ministers added the words: So help me God, was today strongly publicized. Can I ask you about that too?

[Pawlak] I think that this is quite natural. You know, this is not some sort of exceptional phenomenon in present-day Poland.

[Pichlak] And as regards yourself, did you also add these words after the oath?

[Pawlak] No, I did not add these words, and I think that this was apparent because the text of the oath was read. This is, as I said, a matter of the choice of every one of the ministers. And of course one can present one's attachment to the faith more on the outside, one can retain it in one's heart. And I think that that is what is important. [passage omitted]

Olechowski To Continue Foreign Policy Directions

LD2710183893 Warsaw PAP in English 1818 GMT
27 Oct 93

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 27—I will continue the strategic directions of the hitherto foreign policy, I want to familiarise myself with the current issues of the ministry and look through documents, newly appointed Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski said on Wednesday [27 October] when asked about the priorities and changes in Polish foreign policy.

According to Grzegorz Dziemidowicz, acting spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Olechowski wants to focus Polish foreign policy on Poland's integration with European structures. He would also support more active policy in the republics of the former Soviet Union,

particularly in economic terms. His first press conference will be held after prime minister presents his programme to parliament.

At a meeting with civil servants of the Foreign Ministry, Olechowski said that he respects Polish diplomacy and acknowledges its successes. "When I came here to take over and meet Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Olechowski's predecessor) whom I respect very much, I was depressed," Olechowski added.

New Defense Minister Comments on Priorities

WS2710145193 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
27 Oct 93 p 2

[Report by Z.L.: "Admiral Aboard Again"]

[Text] "I am not a skeptic as far as our road to NATO is concerned; I was and I still am a realist. We must strive to achieve that goal because there is no other alternative; however, it is known that this road is long and costly," said Piotr Kolodziejczyk, new minister of national defense, yesterday at the Ministry of National Defense [MON].

The minister, who assumed duties from outgoing Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz in front of Waldemar Pawlak, was wearing a dark blue suit. "I am a civilian minister and I would like to set an example of how a civilian minister of national defense should work," he explained. Kolodziejczyk reported that the Sejm would have to deal with the new law on general defense duties, which would result in a precise distribution of powers in the sphere of controlling the state's defense matters. He said that this was the most urgent issue. The admiral added that before he agreed to be the new defense minister, he made a few conditions to the prime minister, one of which was that this project must be backed up. Waldemar Pawlak accepted this condition. According to the admiral, military special services should serve only military purposes. "A civilian head of MON should bring up issues related to the state's defense at the sessions of the government; he should discuss their relation to certain economic decisions. He should not confine himself only to military matters," stated the minister when asked how he saw his role in a post that he had left less than two years ago to Jan Parys. "It was a barbaric way to say goodbye to me then," he says today.

Admiral Kolodziejczyk did not hide the fact that he had given up a "comfortable civilian life" because Lech Walesa persuaded him to do so. "The president struck a patriotic chord," conceded the minister. The MON head said that rumors spread by the press concerning his allegedly poor health should not be treated seriously. Before he took on the mission, he consulted with doctors. "They did not see any bad indications," declared the admiral, who is now slimmer, has a tanned face, and in general, seems to be in good physical condition.

New Trade Minister Seeks More Exports*LD2710164693 Warsaw PAP in English 1630 GMT
27 Oct 93*

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 27—Pro-export policy and greater openness for eastern markets are among priorities of the newly appointed minister of foreign economic cooperation Leslaw Podkanski. The minister will also support wise and effective state interventionism and will protect Polish products.

Economic policy may succeed fully only when it is based on stable customs, tax systems and the system of stable exchange rates. Now, there is an urgent need to analyse the 1994 draft budget, the minister told journalists.

According to the minister, the government should form a programme guaranteeing active economic policy in the east. Asked about trade protectionism, Podkanski said that Poland, as one of few countries in central Europe, does not protect its market effectively enough. The minister hopes the present government will introduce appropriate changes in this area.

Speaking about privatisation, Podkanski stressed that he opposes the acceleration of privatisation or "enforced privatisation". He voiced the opinion that only companies which are in a difficult financial situation or firms which do not give much hope for the future ought to be privatised.

Solidarity To 'Closely Monitor' New Government*LD2710215093 Warsaw PAP in English 2128 GMT
27 Oct 93*

[Text] Gdansk, Oct. 27—The Solidarity trade union will closely monitor the performance of the new Polish government, to ensure that it upholds the promises made during the election campaign, the national commission of the union declared in Gdansk on Wednesday [27 October].

In its agreed statement, the union's national commission declared that "the parties which have taken power are the inheritors of the (communist - ed.) Polish People's Republic, and are thus alien to our traditions and beliefs... We will scrupulously evaluate them in the light of their election promises, and will not permit them to waste what has been achieved thus far in Poland."

The national commission also criticised "certain tendencies" noted in the union since the elections, as evidenced in the statements of some activists. It criticised "personal disputes, splits, the search at all costs for the guilty parties, actions having nothing in common with clear analysis." Such actions could only lead to the defection of a further group of members from the union, and to a further loss of the authority of Solidarity, the national commission claimed.

Wednesday's session was also marked by the resignation of Solidarity Deputy Chair Janusz Palubicki, in protest

at what he described as the differences between himself and the union leadership. He particularly criticised the role of the union in precipitating the fall of the Suchocka cabinet, which in his opinion had resulted in the formation of a government much less sympathetic to the interests of workers and trade unionists.

The national commission also approved a resolution demanding the implementation of all agreements hitherto agreed between the Polish government and Solidarity, including the state enterprise pact, cost of living compensation, and social consultation on the institution of the state treasury. The commission called on the new government to make clear its attitude on existing collective disputes, including the problems of the public sector, and the question of wage indexation.

Solidarity Head: Government Must Honor Agreements*WS2810091193 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
27 Oct 93 p 2*

[Report by PAD: "I Do Not Have To Talk With Minister Miller"]

[Text] "In reference to the constitutional rule of continuity of power, we will demand that the new government implement all the agreements that were signed between the consecutive governments of the Republic of Poland and the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 'Solidarity,'" said "Solidarity" Chairman Marian Krzaklewski after a session of the National Committee's Presidium. "Solidarity" will send a parcel with documents to the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM].

Krzaklewski did not want to evaluate the composition of the new government. He merely said: "We will not get ecstatic over it; there will be no spectacular political contacts." He criticized the "contacts of certain union activists with representatives of the victorious coalition." He did not want to explain if he was referring to Maciej Jankowski, leader of the Mazowsze region. Asked whether he could imagine negotiations with Leszek Miller as the new labor minister, he said: "Mr. Miller is a typical example of the nomenclature of the former system. I do not have to talk with him. It will be enough if union representatives negotiate with him."

"Solidarity" wants the government to take a stand on all the agreements signed with the union as soon as possible. In particular, it wants the "Pact on Enterprise" to be implemented by the end of this year; it also wants the government to implement the "Agreement on Compensating for the Increase in Maintenance Costs," signed in January of this year, and to consult with it on the Treasury law. The government should also take a stand on all the collective bargaining that is still going on. The possibility cannot be ruled out that "Solidarity" will return to the concept of organizing a referendum on returning private property to the people.

"Each unfavorable change in the agreements will be looked upon by the union as an act of one side breaching the agreement," declared Krzaklewski. "The union will respond by beginning collective bargaining, and resorting to statutory activities, including strikes," said the chairman. "Solidarity" is conducting an inventory of all the agreements that have been signed and that have or have not been put into effect. After the government is constituted, it will forward a parcel containing a few thousand pages of documents to URM.

The Presidium of the National Council asked President Walesa to take steps aimed at resolving the problems of the strike at the "Boguszow" barite mine.

Bank Chief: Banks Not Threatened With Bankruptcy

LD2710220093 Warsaw PAP in English 2030 GMT
27 Oct 93

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 27—President of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz told "Wiedomosci" main news bulletin on Wednesday [27 October] that "banks are not threatened with a wave of bankruptcy" and that their financial condition does not depend on the form of ownership.

We can deposit our savings in private banks without fear, she stressed, pointing to the fact that one can never exclude the possibility that a bank would go bankrupt.

She added that the state has started to take more care of the state-owned banks increasing their capital while the NBP is engaged in activities aimed at the improvement of private banks condition.

The programme to this effect has been presented to the Hanna Suchocka government and will be presented to the Waldemar Pawlak cabinet. "We are very interested in making private banks a substantial element of the so called financial circulation. And we are not going to let any of this circulation elements (private, state or cooperative) to break down," she stressed.

Officials View Current European Problems

LD2710223593 Warsaw PAP in English 2220 GMT
27 Oct 93

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 27—The Polish Peasants Party (PSL), one of the partners in Poland's new ruling coalition, would seek to avoid the imposition of trade barriers, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak (PSL)

told a delegation of European parliamentarians in Warsaw on Wednesday [27 October].

Luczak also told a session of the Parliamentary and Public Relations Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that the new ruling coalition sought western capital assistance in the modernisation of Polish agriculture and industry, and not "a flood of finished products which will disorganise the Polish market."

At the same session, Sejm (lower house) Deputy Ryszard Smolarek (PSL) said that the new government would not make use of any protectionist measures other than those adopted by the European Communities. He supported the concepts of support for agricultural production through intervention payments and export support. We seek equality of treatment, said Smolarek, who claimed that, while government subsidies accounted for 2.5 percent of Polish agricultural incomes, in western Europe, subsidies amounted to 50 percent.

The visiting delegation, comprising French, German and Italian parliamentarians, also expressed its doubts as to the purpose of the existence of the Central European Initiative (ISE), as well as to the chances for success of the trans-border Carpathia Euroregion. The delegates claimed that the ISE could be interpreted as an attempt to isolate Russia. Furthermore, the ISE states, which include Italy, Austria, the Visegrad countries, and several republics of the former Yugoslavia, lack common interests, and any bilateral discussions between participating states might be open to misunderstanding, particularly in the treatment of national minorities.

Later on Wednesday, a Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman defended the role of the ISE as a stabilising factor in the region. Roman Kuzniar of the Foreign Ministry Department of Planning and Analysis said that the ISE was seeking to reduce tension between individual members, and could not be interpreted as an attempt to isolate Russia.

Kuzniar also noted that the Carpathian Euroregion suffered from a lack of effective funding, despite promises of finance from the European Communities. Nevertheless, Poland stood by the concept of cross-border cooperation, he said.

Melescanu, Jordanian Minister Discuss Trade*AU2710063093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1825 GMT 26 Oct 93*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 26/10/1993—The Romanian minister of foreign affairs Teodor Melescanu had Tuesday, 26 October, talks with Ziyad Fariz, minister of planning of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The talks were devoted to assessing the situation in the Middle East and to finding ideas for a global solution to the issues in the area with the participation of all the countries involved.

"We have an excellent cooperation with Romania, especially in trade and investment and it was from this angle that we discussed with our Romanian counterparts all the aspects of cooperation, including the need to expand in future the trade relations between our countries," Ziyad Fariz, who is also chairman of the joint committee, said.

"The Jordanian guest evoked Romania's traditional diplomatic demarches with all the parties involved in the peace process in the Middle East, and said its further activities to this effect would be welcome," Romanian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mircea Geoana stated.

Iliescu Gives News Conference in Vienna*AU2810102593 Bucharest DIMINEATA Supplement in Romanian 21 Oct 93 pp 2, 3, 4*

[Text of "President Ion Iliescu's News Conference at the Romanian Embassy in Vienna on 9 October 1993," at the end of the Council of Europe summit in Vienna—"transcript from tape recording"]

[Text] [Neagu UdROIU, ROMPRES] How do you assess this summit on the whole, particularly since—apart from your scheduled activities—you also had, as is only natural, other contacts with the heads of various parliamentary delegations?

[Iliescu] First of all, let me tell you that everybody, including the speakers at the conference and the summit's conclusions themselves, emphasized the political significance and importance of this meeting. Even French President Mitterrand said that it is only natural that, after so many years of the existence of the Council of Europe, the heads of state and government should be meeting for the first time. Nevertheless, this meeting acquired a totally different character than would have been the case four years ago. Therefore, everybody appreciated the usefulness and political significance of the moment and of the event represented by the meeting of 32 heads of state and government of the countries in the Council of Europe. Everybody appreciated the political significance of the moment when this conference was held and of the changes taking place on the continent, particularly after the disappearance of the "Iron Curtain"—which meant the disappearance of the military, political, and ideological confrontation between the two

parts of the continent—and the creation of a framework for refashioning Europe's unity!

In this respect, the participants emphasized the capacity of the Council of Europe to turn itself into a self-sufficient and wide open European institution, which can rebuild the political and institutional framework required to bring together all the European states.

This issue was approached by several speakers in an interesting way, including President Mitterrand, who was also one of the initiators of this high level meeting.

Therefore, it has been suggested that this institution, the Council of Europe, should assume a new political function and become a meeting ground for all European states, thus creating an institutional framework for Europe's political perspective.

Finally, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Mr. Martinez, suggested that the meeting should augment the current Council of Europe documents, which proceeded from several basic elements: the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the state of law, the prevalence of the law in the contemporary political life, and guarantees of human rights, including the rights of minorities. He suggested that one should supplement the concept of human rights with the economic and social facets of human rights, which must acquire a broader spectrum in the Council's practical activity in this respect.

Others points were also emphasized at the meeting—points which coincided with the opinions expressed by our delegation, too—in connection with the danger posed by the new breach that is beginning to take shape on our continent with the emergence of an ever deepening economic barrier between the two parts of the continent. Therefore, there is a discrepancy, which is ever growing, between the relatively prosperous countries of the West and those currently in a process of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, something which can turn into a future source of tension and conflict on our continent. This issue was discussed in somewhat greater detail at the World Economic Forum in Crans Montana, Switzerland, last June. It was dealt with more earnestly there, by laying emphasis on the political aspects of the problem. Nevertheless, it was also raised during our discussions here. President Mitterrand even spoke of a new form of colonialism or about colonial-type relations, namely a state of dependence that could arise between the rich countries in Europe and the East European countries. We stressed this aspect—as you probably noted from the text of our speech here—in a more detailed and analytical way. We presented this stand at the Crans Montana meeting as well, because, right now the whole continent is really going through a period of profound economic crisis. Both the rich countries on the continent and the world economy as a whole are going through a very serious economic recession. At Crans Montana, the representatives of the Western countries presented, among other things, the serious

situation faced by their economies. As an example, they pointed to the high level of unemployment, with some 35 million jobless people in the West European countries, who have hardly any chance of finding employment, given their very large numbers. The entire evolution of the world economy and of the economies of the West European countries has registered a spectacular and steady development of technology, which led to massive lay-offs in industry and agriculture. You all know the data and figures: the agriculture of these countries is using some 5, 6, or 7 percent of the labor force, while industry is using between 20 and 25 percent. Mind you, this is happening in countries with an outstanding industrial potential.

Their chance was the appearance of the third sector, namely the development of services, which absorbed the manpower laid off by the first two basic production sectors. However, right now even the service sector is affected by the contemporary technological progress. Automation and data processing are rapidly making inroads into trade and other service sectors; employees at various office desks keep disappearing, customers are talking directly to computer terminals, magnetic cards are eliminating salesmen, and so forth. Therefore, the phenomenon of unemployment is acquiring very large dimensions, without any chance of abatement.

At the same time, some people whom I talked to on this subject expressed their worry that, if the countries in Eastern and Central Europe—which have a certain technical and human potential as well as the capacity for intellectual creation—also recover and promote an efficient economy, they will turn into competitors, making even more difficult the solving of such problems as unemployment in the West. I have recently talked to a Belgian businessman who visited our country on this subject. He told me that promoting European cooperation and endorsing the efforts for recovery, economic reform, and the development of efficient economies are worthy endeavors, but what will the West do with its own jobless? I told him that such a viewpoint is wrong and that the economic development of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is the common and only chance for all European countries. On the other hand, we do not ask for alms. In the sphere of economy and economic relations, it is not generosity, but interest that is characteristic of human relations. Consequently, I maintain that it is the common interest of the East and West to cooperate to overcome this period of economic crisis. The recovery, improvement, and normalization of the national economies in this part of the continent as well as their placement on a new foundation and the emergence of viable and competitive social economies do not represent a danger through the kind of competition that they might represent, but rather new opportunities for them, thanks to the increase in living standards and the purchasing power of people in these countries. This also means an increase in the market potential of the East, particularly since the East is a large market with several hundred million people living there, which offers

a good chance for business, provided that partnership relations are being promoted as among equals. It is enough to look at the example provided by the relations among the developed countries. Just take and examine the picture of economic and trade exchanges among various developed states. You will see that the largest share of their trade relations is taken by the other developed countries, not by the poorly developed world.

When I visited Switzerland, I studied several sets of statistics and noted that more than 80 percent of its economic exchanges are with the Common Market countries, not with the European Free Trade Association to which it belongs. Therefore, 80 percent of Switzerland's trade goes to the Common Market, while its exchanges with the Eastern European countries, including Russia, amount to only 3 percent. Therefore, the increase in the economic potential of a country does not reduce but rather, on the contrary, it increases the possibility of cooperation; this also applies to all the developed countries currently faced with difficult economic problems. That is why I maintain that it is our common and only chance to cooperate in this respect. The subject was raised again—in various forms, as I have already said—during today's discussions and was seen as a related subject, albeit not as a proper issue for the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, since the Council of Europe is the only framework for setting up an all-European cooperation platform, we must encourage dialogue and expand the processes of overall European integration.

Regarding the national minorities, a document was worked out and finally adopted. If you saw its contents, You must have noticed that the text is in full accordance with our assessments, position, an appraisals in this respect. You also noted the existence of several nuances in connection with the issue of individual and collective rights, in connection with guaranteeing all the rights and freedoms of minorities in the context of existing constitutional regulations and national legislation, combined with the loyalty required in their capacity as citizens of the states in which they live. These are principles which we have proclaimed, emphasized, and supported, and they were included in this document. Consequently, they are becoming European norms, since we are talking about European norms. You are well aware that we presented our viewpoint on the various steps we are taking in this respect and on the measures we consider as necessary.

We do not find it hard to adjust to all the European norms in the matter of the rights and guarantees of national minority rights. It is more difficult for many other European countries to adjust themselves to these principles.

There is a diversity of approaches on this matter in Europe. There is no single norm or way to approach this problem.

There are states for which the principle of citizenship is prevalent, which do not even discuss the concept of

"national" minority, nor are they prepared to talk about the status of a national minority. In France, for instance, whoever becomes a French citizen is a Frenchman, whether he is black, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Corsican, German, Breton, or whatever. Therefore, they are all French. As far as France is concerned, there is only one country, one citizenship, and one nationality. The concept of nation is the same as the concept of citizenship. This applies to France. Of course, the French have no complexes in their relations with Germany, because the same principle prevails in Germany, too. The Germans do not treat the problem of the French minority in Germany any differently, either. However, this does not mean that we have to rally to the French model.

One cannot go by reference models in this respect. Each country has its own historical traditions and social reality, and each country tackles its problems in keeping with that reality. A certain tradition in dealing with these relations has developed in our country, too, and I believe that we are treating the problem of national minorities in a democratic way, in the conditions specific to Romania, by creating the general framework for the implementation of their own entity and characteristics. From a legal viewpoint, all members and communities of the national minorities have equal rights as all the other citizens of Romania; at the same time, they enjoy conditions for the manifestation of the characteristics specific to each minority. They have what you will not find in many European countries: representatives in Parliament and on local councils, schools in their mother tongue, press, publications, radio and television stations, as well as cultural institutions, particularly of the Hungarian minority, which is the largest in our country.

You may have followed Mr. [Geza] Jeszenszky's [Hungarian minister of foreign affairs] speech, which deals with two issues. Among other things, he combats the idea of loyalty toward the state, after which he pleads and distorts the content of that idea, nonetheless [sentence as published]. We and other participants talked about loyalty to the state whose citizens one is. He referred to governments, claiming that loyalty toward a certain government is a matter of reciprocity: A minority can be loyal to a certain government to the extent that that government is loyal to the respective minority group. What has one got to do with the other? The government is one thing, while we are talking here about the status of citizen of a country and about integration into the general norms of coexistence of the respective country and state and in its structures. Therefore, the issue is loyalty toward a state and country, not toward a certain government.

Then, there is also the issue of collective rights. Many people have addressed this subject. We did not dwell on it a lot, but I heard that Mr. [Alain] Juppe [French minister of foreign affairs] made a tough speech on this matter. A similar stand was taken by several other participants. Therefore, one can say that a balanced document acceptable to everybody was adopted on this issue, which was considered as one of the delicate

subjects that will continue to remain in the attention of the Council of Europe, which was requested to stay active in this respect. This is a reference point that we should all observe. Subjective interpretations should disappear.

[Ilie Serbanescu, TINERETUL LIBER] I realize that you are satisfied with this document to a certain extent. Nevertheless, since we are talking about minorities, I understand that Mr. [Vladimir] Meciar [Slovak prime minister] did not share your very favorable attitude. My reasoning is that we are somewhat "in the same boat," so to speak; therefore, why do we have a relatively different position in this respect?

[Iliescu] I did not hear Mr. Meciar's speech, but I do not think that he had any objection to the document adopted there. From the briefing I received on his address, I understood that he was not at odds with the document. On the contrary, he even emphasized certain aspects pertaining to collective rights, the [Edouard] Balladur [French prime minister] plan, and border changes, with Mr. Juppe further adding that they have renounced to such things and that he considers it obligatory to observe the existing borders and not change them.

[Serbanescu] Nevertheless, at today's news conference, in answer to a question put to him on this subject, Mr. [Alois] Mock [Austrian foreign minister] raised the issue of collective rights, saying that, in his opinion, they do exist, even though their defining at this stage is a delicate affair. My question is: Do you believe that this problem has been buried for good in the Council of Europe or not?

[Iliescu] The point is not whether to bury it or not. In politics, things are being tackled in terms of the prevailing reality and only a realistic approach can be efficient in politics. Therefore, viewpoints differ quite a lot on this matter. As I have always said, we do not find it difficult to adjust to any general acceptance of this concept at a European level. I rather believe that most European states cannot afford to take up our practice in this respect. We have no difficulty in observing everything that is accepted at the European level. Our frequent statements in the past, to the extent that "everything that is good for Europe is good for us, too"—a formulation we also included in the Constitution—confirm that any international regulation has precedence over domestic regulations and also show that we are always ready to adjust our legislation to any improvements that may emerge in the international legislation. Nevertheless, there still are and will continue to be divergent and different viewpoints on this matter, though of course not as far as we or our policy toward minorities is concerned. Others are faced with more difficult tasks, particularly those who do not even want to allow discussion on the subject of national minorities. We do not have such difficulties. Others may have had several outbursts of temper in this respect. It is not by chance that the

Slovaks—I am not talking about Mr. Meciar in particular—are slightly more radical in expressing certain viewpoints, because the issue is more delicate in their country. The Hungarian population is concentrated in the border area there, something that can acquire a dangerous political aspect, if the idea of the separation of an entire region from the state's central authority were to gain ground, that is the idea of so-called territorial autonomy on ethnic grounds. This problem is more serious in Slovakia than in our country, where the only regions with a majority Hungarian population are the two counties in the center of the country [Covasna and Harghita]. It will never be in their interest, or in anyone's interest, for these counties to separate from the rest and create some segregated zones, "bantustans," in the middle of our country. Therefore, we have practically no difficulties in this respect.

Anyway, life will teach us to coexist in a civilized way.

Our perspective is to follow the road taken by Western Europe. If we look at the evolution of events in the western part of the continent and in our region from this angle, we note that confrontations have attenuated in the West. As Mr. Francois Mitterrand said, there were problems that seemed insurmountable, impossible to overcome, such as the conflict between France and Germany, the problem of Alsace, and so forth. People have reached a framework of coexistence and of political, economic, and social integration. Of course, there were two factors that contributed to that: first, the existence of a single danger for all Europe at that time, namely the Soviet danger, which encouraged them to find ways and means to set up certain institutional structures capable of ensuring their united action in the face of the common danger; and second, favorable economic development, which helped them surmount a great many problems of a social nature. This has created the general framework for solving their social-economic problems, which, in the final analysis, is the most important thing if you want to lessen social tensions. After all, national problems and dissent are generated by the tensions, dissatisfaction, and hardships that the people are being confronted with. When things go well, the people prosper and these problems tend to become diluted with the passage of time.

I believe that the Yugoslav conflict was generated by such economic causes. Yugoslavia displayed strength, resilience, and unity during the war, during the German occupation, and during the harsh years of Stalinist pressure. This ethnic and religious conflict broke out there at the very time when Europe's opening began. As a matter of fact, these conflicts were exacerbated by the accumulation of dissent and mutual doubts and suspicions between the more advanced zones—Slovenia and Croatia—and the zones in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, where the ratio between their per capita GDP was something like six to one. This led to the appearance of various tensions. I remember that, when I visited Montenegro in the seventies, there was an ongoing discussion about investment. The Montenegrin

people were suspicious of Slovene capital investment, claiming that it amounted to Slovene capital exploiting the labor of the people of Montenegro. The Slovenes were also displeased that their capital surplus was being exported to Montenegrin wretches. This was the time of [Edvard] Kardelj's [prominent Slovene and party ideologist in Marshal Tito's time] amendment to the Constitution, which suggested the setting up of a federal fund to support the more backward areas and reduce the discrepancies among the republics. Well, his endeavor failed. That amendment was not passed at the time. Therefore, it is obvious that indications of emerging states of tension were becoming obvious even at that time. They have been simmering since then, only to break out all the more dramatically today.

[Valentin Paunescu, CURIERUL NATIONAL] Mr. President, what, in your opinion, did Romania gain by participating in this first all-European meeting at the level of heads of state?

[Iliescu] It joined the rest of the world and the Council of Europe community.

[Emil Hurezeanu, Radio Free Europe] Mr. President, I have two questions to put to you. At the end of this stage, Romania's admission to the Council of Europe is considered to be a collective success for the entire political class of Romanian society, which is in a process of democratization. Nevertheless, one should not forget that Romania was admitted to the Council of Europe at a later date and with more difficulty than other countries, on top of which you have the respective amendments. Who is politically responsible within Romania—there are also explanations to be found outside the country—for this delay, for these difficulties, and for Romania's late admission to the Council of Europe?

[Iliescu] All those who also deserve to reap the benefits of this deed. I will cite for you later two examples of people who keep raising obstacles to our initiatives and who keep complaining even when they are doing fine.

[Emil Hurezeanu] The second question: Some more recent statements by several Russian leaders, about which I am sure you have been briefed, suggest reservations and even hostility toward the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries in NATO structures. It is true that the North Atlantic Alliance itself is in no hurry to extend its umbrella over these countries. Two questions here: When will Romania officially request admission to NATO? Do the executive power in Bucharest and you yourself subscribe to this admission? Basically, Moscow's more recent perception is that Eastern Europe, including Romania, continues to be within Russia's sphere of strategic interest and security. Do you feel any kind of pressure in Bucharest from the Russian Federation?

[Iliescu] You are aware of our statement released at the time when we learned of this position allegedly expressed by President Boris Yeltsin, namely that we do not need anybody's approval if and when we decide that we want

or do not want to join NATO! Therefore, as far as Romania's foreign policy is concerned, we have not asked, do not ask, and are not going to ask for anyone's endorsement or approval. There is nothing to talk about or comment in this respect. We just wanted to state this publicly, so that there can be no doubt about it. Similarly, I can tell you that there are not and there cannot be any pressures on us to stay in anyone's sphere of influence. Romania's policy is being mapped out in Romania.

Of course, the problems are not simple right now, owing to the new situation created on the continent. We have also sent a letter to Mr. [Manfred] Woerner [NATO secretary general] in connection with certain discussions regarding the prospects of expanding the framework of his organization and the need for NATO to play a balancing role on the continent, so as to ensure the equal security of all European states. Any actions capable of introducing certain elements of differentiating or gradual treatment, so to speak, vis-a-vis the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, might create tension on the continent and weaken the sentiment and degree of equal security of all the states in Europe. I would like to emphasize that we have encountered a similar viewpoint here, and our fears—and subsequent approaches—in this respect were allayed. Either all of us or none, either all of us at the same time, or nobody.

We now have a cooperation framework with NATO, in the Cooperation Council, on the basis of partnership. We also have an active presence in NATO and the Western European Union. This framework can be developed so as to engage ever more countries in this process. This was our principled position and it is still valid today. We found understanding for our position among politicians from such diverse countries as France, England, and Germany, who expressed similar points of view on this matter. First of all, they believe that the problem of accepting new members is not topical now. If it comes up, it must be dealt with in such a way as to avoid new dissent and tensions among the states of the region. Otherwise, the issue would do a disservice to European security and to the mission and role that NATO understands itself to be playing in the process of security on the continent.

[Dorin Suciu, Budapest correspondent for Romanian Television]: Mr. President, I would not have put this question to you, if your address to the meeting had not touched on the idea of a "golden curtain" that is ready to replace the "Iron Curtain" and separate rich Europe from poor Europe. But let me elaborate on the context in which I would actually like to put my question. After Romania's acceptance onto the Council of Europe, the Hungarian press and mass media in general have displayed, as was somewhat to be expected, a certain amount of frustration, but also, I must confess, a realistic attitude. An editorial in NEPSZABADSAG, a socialist daily with a circulation of more than 1 million copies, printed a commentary that introduced the following idea: The Council of Europe's decisions are actually being taken in terms of the various political interests at

stake, or rather, of the "great political interests." As a matter of fact, the decisions are not taken in Strasbourg, but in Brussels, depending on the interests of the 12 EC members, which actually has led to our country's admission to the Council of Europe. We, as countries from the former socialist camp, only have to play the game of the great Western powers, being kept in the anteroom and divided by this "golden curtain," which tends to become increasingly oppressive. Did you ever get the feeling, here in Vienna, that conference decisions are not being taken in Vienna, but rather in Brussels?

[Iliescu] I shall comment on the commentary in question! This assessment was linked to Romania's admission to the Council of Europe. All right. If such a question exists, it is valid for all admissions, beginning with Hungary and, if such a suspicion were made in connection with those who are active behind the scenes, the result would be that they acted behind the scenes in the cases of Hungary and Romania. Thus, not only in Romania's case.

As far as interests are concerned, so to speak, we have no such considerations. Major things always imply all sorts of interests and, of course, decisionmakers and influential people also promote their own interests. We do not want, nor do we start from the premise that our interests may be promoted despite the interests of others. I think that the general idea in international relations should be to seek a combination of bilateral, regional, multilateral, continental, and world interests. The fact that, in one way or another, certain power circles may influence things for the better or to a greater extent, is nothing new in the history of human civilization, nor in present-day history. Everything depends on seeking a way to link our interests to those of all who are influential, in one way or another, in various decisionmaking structures at the international level. Therefore...

[Dorin Suciu] More explicitly put, was Romania admitted, without deserving it, only because there were Western interests favoring its admission?

[Iliescu] By the way, without deserving it: Unfortunately, because someone was talking about responsibility, thus, unfortunately, there are also Romanian "lame ducks"; I do not know whose interests they heed, because one always has to look for interests, and I do not know who pays them; this is the mentality of the mercenary who launched such ideas. [sentence as published]

Thus, this is a moment of national satisfaction; at least that is what I think it should be. For any ordinary person, for any citizen of Romania, the country's admission to the Council of Europe can only be a cause of satisfaction. Well, in the press, a certain part of the press, as some people put it, we were able to note really dismal commentaries and I asked myself: "What are these people thinking?" The freedom of the press is one thing, but when it comes to national interests and to disseminating foul thoughts, hostile to the country and hostile to our country's interests, is this still part of the freedom of

press? I am talking about, how shall I put it, the moral strength or the moral credentials of such thoughts and of such people. Anton Uncu writes in ROMANIA LIBERA: "The Viennese press... agrees: Romania's admission [to the Council of Europe] was a mistake. It is clear that one cannot trust Romania's commitments as long as Foreign Minister Melescanu signs the European Convention on Human Rights in Vienna, while in Bratislava Romanian President Ion Iliescu—in contrast with the spirit and provisions of the convention signed on Thursday [7 October]—ridicules the problem of minority rights by giving precedence to the problem of their loyalty to the state."

You are familiar with my address to the Slovak Parliament, for this is what he is talking about. Where were the rights of minorities ridiculed? I said there and I have said here what was adopted—as you can note—as the position of a document of the Council of Europe that was accepted by all 32 states.

"Mrs. Lalumiere's affirmation," Anton Uncu continues, regarding the "strange Jiu Valley miners' incursion into Bucharest, rang in our ears like the 'clemency' of the Pope of Avignon toward the 'sinful' Ion Iliescu, who—as is known in Romania and as his speeches may prove—summoned the miners to Bucharest." This is how ROMANIA LIBERA and Mr. Uncu comment on the event in Vienna and Romania's admission to the Council of Europe. Now you can judge the nature of such thinking and of such a journalist, so that I do not have to do so myself.

As for Cristoiu's EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, this is what Cristoiu chooses to publicize in connection with the Vienna meeting: "In this parade (of political figures), Ion Iliescu is an exception. All the others, as I state above, walked along just looking ahead. Ion Iliescu, however, passed by spreading his sweet smiles left and right. At the entrance, our president caught a glimpse of some smart-looking gentlemen. They were in charge of the security of the hotel. Mistaking them for officials, Ion Iliescu dashed up to them and shook their hands for a long time, smiling intensely. The result? So that such a gaffe might not be repeated with other heads of states, the bemused hotel security people were immediately withdrawn from the area." I do not know if Cristoiu was in the hotel when I came in. "Apart from this gaffe, which I blame on our protocol people, I cannot help admitting that I was a little proud that there were a few countries, including Russia, Ukraine, and Croatia, which stayed..." That was Cristoiu's commentary. This is the mentality of a man who rummages in garbage cans for foul-smelling things. This is what Mr. Cristoiu does in the Romanian press! You who were there, do you recognize anything that this individual writes here? I beg your pardon? Thus you were bodyguards! [sentence as published]

[Rodica Madosa, Radio-Current Events] Mr. President, among the latest press communiques issued this lunchtime, there is a rather striking headline: "The Vienna Meeting, a Stepping Stone for Local and Regional

Autonomy." It is said that in the declaration that was adopted that the Permanent Conference of Local and Regional Authorities—I have just learned this now; I have to confess that I did not know about it before—is a Council of Europe body with a status equivalent to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. And further, within the development of "a Europe of regions" one may consider that this decision puts into operation the principle of subsidiarity, which requires cooperation and trust between central governments and local and regional authorities. I would like to ask you what this is all about, because I have the impression that things are too little and inexactly known in our country.

[Iliescu] The Council of Europe promoted such an idea: Apart from relations at state level, the encouragement and support of direct relations between local authorities, bodies of local administration, and local economic entities of cross-border cooperation with neighboring areas. In principle, we have nothing against this idea. You know that we objected to a certain initiative with a certain undercurrent, and we let the Hungarian and other representatives know about it. We have nothing against an initiative for a Carpathian zone and it could be that we come up with an initiative in this respect in order to develop our mountain economy. We have a team that has for years now been studying this question; a center for studying this specific matter has been set up in the mountainous areas of Vatra Dornei, and there is the idea to expand cooperation in the mountain economy using its characteristics. There are interesting experiences; this team has been abroad a few times and had an exchange of experience with Switzerland and Austria, which have equally interesting things in this area. Cooperation in the Carpathian zone may thus be promoted.

What we disliked was Hungary becoming the initiator of a so-called "Euro-Carpathian" zone and Mrs. Lalumiere being present in Debrecen, where this initiative was launched and where Romania was not present. I had a discussion with her in Crans Montana and congratulated her on being present at that meeting.

I said to her: "Now a fresh invitation for a new initiative by Hungary for a Euro-Adriatic region should be expected." And she asked me: "But what is the connection between Hungary and the Adriatic?" To which I answered: "What is the connection with the Carpathian mountains? I myself can come up with a suggestion of how one can find a motivation for the Adriatic as well. [Hungarian wartime dictator] Horthy was an imperial admiral in the Adriatic Sea. Thus it follows that Hungary can very well claim to become the initiator of a plan for such an area. Therefore, at one point or another we can also think of an initiative for cooperation in the Balaton area [Hungary], together with Slovenia, Austria, and other countries; possibly without Hungary." I said even more, when Hungary says "Carpathians," this essentially means Transylvania for a Romanian; it means revisionism. That is the political implication of such an initiative. We are not against the principle as such: We

favor cross-border cooperation and cooperation in zones of common interests and common characteristics; but, from these proven facts and the criticism made about some of these initiatives, the very idea is underlined that such local initiatives may trigger a conflict with the central administration and state unity; this principle has been included in the documents of the Council of Europe. I agree with supporting and encouraging local initiatives, but they should not lead to conflict with the national interests of the countries in question or with national integrity of the respective states.

[Ilie Serbanescu, TINERETUL LIBER] Mr. President, with reference to Mr. Suci's question, I personally thought that it was a very oblique question. The problem is this: Hungary considered itself the "foundling" of Western Europe for a few years after 1989; now we have also made our appearance and they feel that they are no longer being spoiled. The problem is as follows—and I think that this is what the editor in question was hinting at—and I formulate the question as follows: Does the fact that so far the West has had a certain stance toward Romania and now has changed it play any role?

[Iliescu] Certainly, but without names and specifications. We were told frankly: We admit that we made a mistake in Romania's case; we have also made a mistake in our calculations when assessing the forces, the balance of forces, within the country; we made a mistake when we supported those whom we should not have, and when we had reservations and hostile attitudes toward those who were given a mandate by the people; for, we have to bear in mind those who have a mandate.

This is something many of us do not understand, including politicians and journalists. When Mr. Clinton was elected, he did not even have a majority; he received only 40 percent; Mr. Bush took off his hat, greeted him, and addressed the nation, saying: "Here is the new President of the United States." In America, the president is an institution and it is a scared institution at that. There is an electoral campaign and anything is permitted in such a campaign. The elections are over. Once elected, he becomes the president of all Americans, the President of the United States.

In our country the electoral mayhem continues even today, after so much time. This proves the lack of political culture. Unfortunately, some people maintain such an atmosphere, which is not beneficial for us. Moreover, within the same context, someone said to me: "Sir, I have never encountered so much paranoia as in your country. I have been in Slovakia, and I had talks with all the representatives of the opposition forces; when national interests were at stake, there was a common language. Wherever you go, it is the same thing. In your country, however, if you talk to various individuals you can note—even now—the venom and hatred that they feel for other people. There is this paranoia in your political life and in your press." This was his remark as a man, an able man with great political responsibility.

[Horia Alexandrescu, CRONICA ROMANA] Mr. President, there is a lot of discussion about what was behind the problem with Hungary. But the Vienna Statement is very clear about territorial claims or other claims of this kind. Thus, things have been clarified officially. With regard to today's statement, the amendments established for us in Strasbourg when we were admitted, to which we attach great importance, and bearing in mind what the Vienna Statement contains, I would like to ask whether you think that from now on we will have difficulties with the respective amendments; in other words, do you believe that among those amendments or in today's statement there is any problem linked to democracy and human rights that may create difficulties for us in the coming period?

[Iliescu] Examining the documents adopted in Vienna, the nine recommendations made to Romania, and our political practice, you may judge for yourself whether we have any difficulties in this respect. Certainly, we will have to treat all these things seriously, set appropriate examples, and give certain signals in this respect. Some details turn into principled questions. We have no problems and encounter no difficulties in abiding by the norms of the Council of Europe. In Strasbourg, someone appropriately said: Romania is asked to do what many states present here are not able to. But this is not bad. Such demands are not to our disadvantage, but on the contrary.

[Virginia Ghita, EXPRESS] Mr. President, since we are talking of amendments, one of them refers to the problem of homosexuals, which is really a problem in Romania. As you know, and our magazine has written about this, currently there are 67 people in prison in Romania on charges of homosexuality. There is this case in Timisoara. The amendment specifies, among other things, that these people must be released and the Penal Code has to be revised in this respect. You know that there is this article in the Penal Code, which condemns sexual relations between people of the same sex. What is your position on this problem and do you intend to draw parliament's attention to repealing that article?

[Iliescu] All the recommendations are being studied by the government, parliament, and judicial bodies so as to examine things carefully and decide on measures that have to be taken to clarify all these things.

As far as homosexuality is concerned, I think that it is not a penal question, but a moral one, that is, a matter of conduct. I do not know of any concrete instance of people arrested on such charges, or sentenced for that matter. I knew only of a single case in which an international organization intervened, namely Amnesty International; I have passed it on to be examined so that we know what it is all about. The individual was not punished for homosexuality, but for molesting a minor for homosexual reasons. Thus, the case in question referred to such a thing; that is why the individual was punished. I think that this is a question that depends on the conduct of each person and judicial bodies should

not intervene in such matters. It is not difficult to eliminate such matters. It is not the Penal Code that solves such problems. But I cannot say any more without confirmation from the Ministry of Justice.

PSM Leader on Party's International Relations

AU2710062393 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 22 Oct 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ilie Verdet, president of the Socialist Party of Labor, by Al. Campeanu; place and date not given: "The Socialist Party of Labor Is Expanding Its International Relations"]

[Text] [Campeanu] Mr. Verdet, you have paid several visits abroad. How would you describe your party's foreign relations?

[Verdet] Since its creation, the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] proposed to be active at all levels in order to publicize its policy and aims and to make its activity at home known. We have established contacts with more than 60 socialist and workers parties throughout the world. We have briefed them on our program, by-laws, and activity. We have received answers from almost all these political formations. Within this framework, we have also contacted the Socialist International and expressed our desire for future cooperation. We have actually established contacts and conducted talks with the socialist parties in such neighboring countries as the Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine, as well as with the parties in Germany, Austria, Italy, France—including the Communist Party—Portugal, and Greece. As is known, I paid a visit to the PRC at the invitation of the Communist Party, where I conducted talks and made an exchange of experience. We have also held talks with the Korean Workers Party. We are corresponding with the Socialist Party of Japan and the Communist Party in that country, as well as with the parties in Vietnam and Mongolia. I recently visited Iraq at the invitation of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. We have held talks with the Syrian Socialist Ba'th Party and with the PLO. The framework of these relations—through direct contacts or correspondence—are beneficial for both sides and are an opportunity to brief each other and express our points of view on certain international, European, and world issues.

Our party's National Committee includes a Department of Relations with Leftist, Socialist, and Workers Parties, which is carrying out a comprehensive activity.

[Campeanu] What are the results of your talks in Iraq?

[Verdet] The six-day visit to Iraq was paid at the invitation of the Steering Committee of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. We were received quite warmly

and we conducted talks with numerous leadership cadres of that party and its Foreign Policy Department. Aside from the cadres strictly belonging to the party leadership, we also had meetings and discussions with the vice president of the Republic of Iraq, the parliament president, the government vice president, the foreign minister, the minister of trade, and other members of the Iraqi executive power. At the end of our visit, we signed a document on future cooperation between the two parties. This also includes cooperation between the party press, as well as cooperation between Romanian socio-professional organizations, which maintain relations with Iraq and have close links with the Socialist Party of Labor, on the one hand, and similar Iraqi organizations, on the other.

[Campeanu] What conclusions have been reached regarding relations between the two countries?

[Verdet] Inevitably, during the discussions we also broached the question of relations between Romania and Iraq. We are talking primarily about economic relations. Both sides expressed the desire to overcome the current stage—created because of the war and the embargo, which neither part desired, but which led to a break in the intense relations that had existed before the embargo—and to restore these relations on the basis of the following principles that were established by the two countries a long time ago, namely the principles of mutual respect and advantage in economic and scientific-technical cooperation and developing trade relations. We are convinced that the current state of things created by the embargo will be overcome and relations between the two countries will resume their normal course and will be beneficial.

[Campeanu] Mr. Verdet, there has been talk of late about a possible meeting of leftist parties in Europe and, on another level, a meeting of those parties in the Balkan area.

[Verdet] For a long time, there has been talk about a meeting of the European socialist parties or, in general, of leftist parties. I do not, however, know of any final form of such a meeting. There have been several meetings by groups of parties of the democratic leftists but not at a European level. Regarding a meeting of socialist parties, which should include a wide range and, in general, parties with a leftist orientation in the Balkan area, there have been consultations, including with our party, which agreed with the organization of such a meeting. As far as I can say at this time, the problem that is posed is that of a location for such a meeting and the subjects that should be examined at such a meeting. I do not know, however, what other political forces in Romania could participate in that meeting. As far as the PSM is concerned, it has said that it will participate in a possible meeting of this kind.

**Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 28 October
WA2810174293**

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Bosnian Serbs reportedly shell Sarajevo ... Stoltenberg accuses Muslims of responsibility for attack on UN aid convoy ... Bosnian Croats deny massacring Muslims ... Yugoslav inflation rate reaches new high.

MILITARY

SERBS REPORTEDLY SHELL SARAJEVO (AFP): UNPROFOR spokesman says Bosnian Serb forces lobbed 400 artillery shells on southeastern district of

Sarajevo, targeting area previously held by rebel Muslim commander who was arrested and killed on 26 October. (AU2810112493)

MUSLIMS ACCUSED OF ATTACK (AFP): International mediator Stoltenberg accuses Muslim troops of being "responsible for" a 25 October attack on UN aid convoy that killed Danish driver, wounded eight other UN personnel. UN has ordered a halt to all aid convoys until it is given "firm guarantees" from the warring factions that their safety will be ensured. (AU2710204093)

HUMANITARIAN

CROATS DENY COMMITTING MASSACRE (Zagreb Radio): Bosnian Croat forces deny UNPROFOR charges that they massacred Muslim villagers in Stupni Dol, claim deaths, burned houses caused by "fierce clashes" between Croatian, Muslim forces. (LD2710153093)

ECONOMIC

FRY INFLATION RATE REACHES NEW HIGH (TANJUG): Yugoslav Federal Statistics Bureau reports inflation rate reaches new high of 10.5 percent per day. (LD2710203293)

Serbian Attack on Sarajevo 'Repulsed Successfully'

*AU2810095893 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 28 Oct 93*

[The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps report from Sarajevo]

[Text] Since early morning the Serbian aggressor has been pounding with all his artillery the first defense lines of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the region of Colina Kapa and Zlatiste. Since 0700 the aggressor's tank from Vrace has been shelling (?Zeleno Brdo) and Bogusevac. At 0800 the enemy launched an infantry attack in the area of Colina Kapa and Zlatiste. This attack was repulsed successfully. Over 200 tank shells, some 30 mortars, and about 20 artillery shells have so far landed on the defense lines of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army fighters.

The general alarm has been sounded in the city and the citizens are warned to [words indistinct].

Defense Ministry Protests Attack

*AU2810100093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 28 Oct 93*

[Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Defense Ministry has lodged a protest with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] generals in connection with this morning's attack on Sarajevo, launched at 0650.

Some 285 tank shells, 22 mortars, and 24 howitzer shells have landed on the city so far. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Defense Ministry is reminding UNPROFOR that Sarajevo is a safe haven and that the UN forces have only been observing the destruction of the city.

This protest stresses that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will respond to the attacks, and that it should not again be accused of violating the cease-fire.

Delic, Alispahic Discuss Sarajevo Crackdown

*AU2710170193 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1438 GMT 27 Oct 93*

[Report on news conference by Rasim Delic, commander of General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic in Sarajevo on 27 October—recorded]

[Text] As you have just heard, esteemed viewers and hearers, Commander Rasim Delic stressed that this operation had been carefully planned in order to ensure that it was effective and with as little casualties as possible. The [words indistinct] tipped the scales on 18 October, when the (?Prokop) Company was looted. This was preceded by the capture of UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] vehicles. These acts cannot be overlooked, said Commander Delic.

The Interior Ministry and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army had begun preparations for this operation a long time ago in order to suppress criminal acts that were perpetrated by certain individuals from the 9th Motorized and 10th Hill Brigade. Our goal was to conduct the operation quickly and without any casualties and to place these individuals in custody without armed resistance, said Commander Rasim Delic in his introductory speech. [Words indistinct] these problems, gathered material and evidence of criminal activity that had been perpetrated by individuals in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, said Bosnia-Herzegovina Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic. Our role is specific, because we are not in charge of individuals, members of the Army. [Words indistinct] when the Presidency issued the order that [words indistinct] Interior Ministry, we efficiently and successfully conducted the operation, said Bakir Alispahic.

As planned, 540 members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have been taken into custody. All bases, which according to existing information were the bases from which the criminal activities were conducted, have been taken. Four hundred and twenty-eight of the 540 members of these units have been released, while [words indistinct] are still in custody. Seven persons have been placed in special custody. Seventeen people have been killed; three of them members of the Sarajevo Security Service, six members of the military police, and eight civilians who were killed in the [words indistinct] region of the base of the former commander of the 10th Hill Brigade, Musan Topalovic "Caco." The names and the circumstances under which these persons were killed will be announced over the course of the day.

The operation began at 0530 yesterday morning, said Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. By 1800, all the bases were captured or [words indistinct], except in the case of two separate bases where Musan Topalovic and Ramiz Delalic were sequestered. [Words indistinct] were blocked, but we could not deal with these two bases in military fashion because there were hostages—civilians—in both of them. Delalic held 25 hostages, while Topalovic had 50. We had to apply combined measures—military pressure and negotiations. At around 2000, we managed to convince Delalic to give himself up, together with 100 of his supporters, and release the hostages, said Commander Delic.

Similarly, at around 2400—with the employment of combined pressures—we resolved the situation in Topalovic's base. Commander Delic expressed [words indistinct] of the 10th and 9th Brigades, and said that they should not be [words indistinct] with individuals. The best evidence of this is the number of released members who immediately [words indistinct] of the legitimate authorities. Topalovic committed a massacre on members of the military police and the Army. A report will be released after the investigation is carried out. However, it is already known beyond a doubt that Musan Topalovic personally led and issued orders for the massacre

and, in some cases, carried it out himself. It was stated at the news conference that evidence of this would be presented to the public.

Two members of the military police and two civilians were also injured. They were wounded by snipers. Some members of the 9th Motorized Brigade were also wounded. However, this number must be taken with reserve, stressed Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Commander Rasim Delic. In response to a correspondent's question, Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic said that the action against crime is not over yet, and that this was a significant step forward toward establishing conditions for preventing the appearance of such events in other places in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Commander Delic said that Musan Topalovic "Caco" had been taken from his base to the 1st Corps base, where he was being held for interrogation. From there, he was supposed to be transferred to prison. However, he attempted to escape and was fatally wounded in the process. Other details will be disclosed in a report that will be presented to the public in due course. Esteemed viewers, this is all from today's press conference held by Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Commander Rasim Delic and Bosnia-Herzegovina Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic.

TANJUG Reports Crackdown

LD2710165593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1626 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Belgrade, October 27 (TANJUG)—Musan Topalovic Caco, commander of a Muslim brigade in Sarajevo, was killed in the Muslim section of Sarajevo on the night of October 26-27 when trying to flee the security forces which on Tuesday [26 October] launched a campaign of suppressing war profiteering and other crimes.

News agencies on Wednesday quoted a statement released by the Muslim military police as saying that Topalovic had surrendered to the soldiers who surrounded his base but broke away and tried to flee on the way to the police car, when he was killed in the shooting by the police.

Topalovic, a criminal, recently disarmed six soldiers of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and seized two UNPROFOR armoured personnel carriers, which he later returned but without the machine-guns and other weapons in them.

Muslim Radio Sarajevo reported that Ramiz Delalic Celo, deputy commander of another local Muslim brigade, surrendered on Tuesday night after his headquarters were surrounded by the military police. According to Radio Sarajevo, the military police freed the 25 civilians held hostage at the Delalic headquarters.

Roughly 200 Muslim soldiers were arrested in Sarajevo on Tuesday night on charges of black-marketeering and banditry.

Muslim Radio Sarajevo on Sunday warned that the rise in crime, including the number of murders, in the Muslim section of Sarajevo had reached a critical point and the Muslim section of the city would fall prey to absolute anarchy unless all measures were taken to suppress crime.

United Nations and Red Cross officials have steadily been victims of attacks and robbery and U.N.-protected teams have been prevented by shots from the Muslim side to repair damages on the electricity and water supply systems. The latest such case occurred recently and involved Canadian members of the U.N. Protection Force.

Muslims have been stopping foreign journalists and U.N. officials at check-points and letting them through only after taking away their bullet-proof vests and other more expensive articles which they later use to sell.

Bosnian Serbs have so far been solely blamed in the West for all the sufferings of the 270,000 Sarajevans who have been living on scant supplies of food, water and electricity for the past 18 months of the civil war between Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the latest developments show that the culprits are to be found on the other side.

Seventeen Killed

LD2710194793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1933 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Belgrade, Oct 27 (TANJUG)—Seventeen people have been killed in Sarajevo in showdowns between forces loyal to radical Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic and the alleged profiteers from among the Moslem army ranks, the Moslem Radio Sarajevo reported on Wednesday [27 October].

The radio quoted Moslem Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic as stating that those killed were three Moslem security service men, six Moslem military policemen, who were massacred, and eight civilians.

Foreign agencies quoted Alispahic as saying that Commander Topalovic and his men 'massacred civilian and military policemen they were holding hostage.'

The Moslem Radio Sarajevo said that 95 out of the 530 arrested members of the Moslem army were retained in custody.

Moslem Brigade Commander in Sarajevo Musan Topalovic-Caco was killed on the night between Tuesday and Wednesday when he was trying to escape Izetbegovic's security forces. Deputy commander of another local brigade Ramiz Delalic-Celo surrendered on Tuesday night to the military police who surrounded the building where he was hiding. From this building, 25 civilians held hostage were then released.

Further Clashes Among Muslims Reported

AU2710162393 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Clashes among the Muslims have continued in Tuzla between the supporters of the idea of autonomy and the Tuzla Ministry of Internal Affairs. The situation is the same in Bihac and in the villages of Johovica, Skokovi, and Pecigrad, where the soldiers of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia are fighting against forces loyal to Alija Izetbegovic.

The Muslim radio reported that five people were killed on each side and several dozens wounded.

Sarajevo Radio Reports Clashes in Bihac

AU2710202393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Members of the 5th Corps continue to fight on two fronts, reads this evening's 5th Corps statement from Bihac. In addition to the aggressor's frequent shelling of Orljanska Glavica and Ribicka Glavica, Abdic's rebels have intensified their activities in Johovica, despite attempts at solving the tragic situation in this area in a peaceful way.

The rebel groups have remained deaf to all appeals for rationality, and yesterday wounded five members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. However, according to what is stated in the 5th Corps report, every new wounded member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in conflicts with the independence seekers [autonomasi] provokes anger and an additional homogenization of our troops and units.

The audacity of the rebels knows no limits, reads the same statement. The latest insulting act of their leaders is a proposal in which the Bosniaks are offered a border crossing in Bosanska Otoka, a town in which the chetniks—their new allies—have destroyed and burned 38 houses, committed a massacre of the civilian population, and destroyed all the bridges. The irony is complete when one knows that not a single Serb has ever lived in Bosanska Otoka, yet it is precisely they who appear in this proposal as the landowners of Bosanska Otoka, with the firm guarantee of Abdic's traitorous leadership.

Croats Deny Committing Massacre of Muslims

LD2710153093 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Report by correspondent Zdenko Vranjes from Mostar]

[Excerpt] In response to the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] report on the massacre in the village of Stupni Dol near Vares, the department for public relations in the office of the Herceg-Bosna president has reiterated that, according to an inspection carried out by Herceg-Bosna military and civilian officials, the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] did not commit a

massacre in the village of Stupni Dol. The HVO did not invade a defenseless village, because what actually happened was that the Muslim army was defeated after fierce clashes in the village. According to the same source, 39 Muslim soldiers who used the houses in the village for military purposes were killed in the fighting. However, if instances of murder not caused by direct military activity are determined, the military and civilian authorities of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna will be instructed to launch an investigation and prosecute the culprits. [passage omitted]

Croats Reportedly Preparing Offensive in Vares

AU2710195293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Report by an unidentified correspondent]

[Excerpts] By now, we are all familiar with what the ustasas did in the village of Stupni Dol. However, this seems not to have been enough, so the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] members again employed artillery with the goal of killing the remaining citizens who found safety in fleeing the area. The HVO members demonstrate all their force from a distance because they are aware that they would pay a high price in any kind of close encounter with our fighters.

Vares, and the Muslims there, continue to face hellish days created by Boban's servants and wretches; all this in cooperation with Karadzic's chetniks, with the goal of destroying everything that bears the name Bosniak. According to information from the headquarters of the East Operative Group, the chetniks launched 15 shells against the villages of the Vares free territory; the ustasha exhibited an even blacker soul by using rockets in addition to shells; they launched rockets against the regions of Pajtov Han, Budozelje, and Dabravina with the goal—I repeat—of destroying everything that is not loyal to the criminal Boban.

During the attack and capture of Stupni Dol, Rajic's and Boban's butchers, armed to the teeth, mainly demonstrated their heroism toward defenseless women and children. In a manner so bestial that the human mind can hardly grasp it, they killed children, even babies. [passage omitted]

In the name of what policy and what ideology were these children killed? The ustasha, probably. The criminals, headed by Ivica Rajic, must answer for these atrocities. According to the latest information from Vares, the HVO extremists in Vares have arrested all men of Muslim nationality, aged 18 to 65, and have imprisoned them in two gunpowder warehouses: in the Vladimir Nazor primary school in Vares and in a school in Donji Vares. Only the number of those imprisoned in the Vladimir Nazor school, where 233 prisoners are incarcerated, is known.

All Muslim men have been imprisoned, even those who expressed their loyalty to the HVO in Vares. Among

them are those who used to be ministers in the government of the HVO in Vares. People from mixed marriages whose one parent is a Muslim have also been arrested. It was requested of the International Red Cross to establish the state of the prisoners, but the representatives of this humanitarian organization still have not responded.

We received information that a new concentration of HVO troops has been sighted from the direction of Vares toward the Kakanj commune. According to intelligence data, we can soon expect an Ustasha offensive in the region of Kraljeva Sutjeska.

Serbs Accused of Massacre in Srebrenica

AU2710195793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] What the citizens of Srebrenica feared, and what they warned the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] of before they abandoned several monitoring points, is beginning to happen. Yesterday, in the afternoon hours, a chetnik subversion group from Bratunac infiltrated the demilitarized zone and massacred several civilians who happened to be in the fields. All this occurred in Becevo, in the place where UNPROFOR recently had its monitoring station.

Stoltenberg: Muslims Attacked UN Aid Convoy

AU2710204093 Paris AFP in English 2010 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Geneva, Oct 27 (AFP)—Thorvald Stoltenberg, the UN mediator on the former Yugoslavia, said Wednesday [27 October] that Moslem forces were responsible for an attack on an aid convoy that left a Danish driver dead and eight UN soldiers wounded.

Stoltenberg said a preliminary report by the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia showed that predominantly Moslem government troops opened fire on the convoy on Monday as it was stopping at a checkpoint controlled by Croat forces.

"Once I get their final report, I will contact President (Alija) Izetbegovic," the UN mediator said. "I am convinced that he will agree that this is unacceptable."

Following the attack, the United Nations ordered a halt to all aid convoys until it is given firm guarantees from the warring factions that they will ensure the safety of humanitarian workers.

A Danish driver for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] was killed in the attack along the main route linking southern and central Bosnia. Eight others were wounded, including seven Dutch UN troops.

Stoltenberg is to travel to Zagreb Thursday, following by visits to Belgrade, Sarajevo and possible Skopje to continue his talks on finding a solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

The former Norwegian foreign minister echoed the statements of his EC counterpart Lord Owen on a suggested meeting of all parties along the lines of the London conference in August 1992.

"We will call a new conference only when we have concrete proposals to submit to the parties," he said. "There must be thorough preparation and it will take months."

"I hope then the issues will be the peace agreement, reconstruction, humanitarian aid and the lifting of sanctions."

Stoltenberg said that a new approach incorporating all the aspects of the conflict was aimed at encouraging all parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to reexamine the offers already on the table.

RSK Official Denies Plans for Land Exchange

AU2710164493 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] In view of recent statements by individual high officials of the republic of Srpska and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, alleging an exchange of territories between western Slavonia and the Sava Basin, Milena Tanjga, information minister in the government of the republic of Serbian Krajina, has stated the following for the ISKRA news agency:

We condemn irresponsible statements and announcements of some exchange of territories. Such statements are unfounded and only cause anxiety among the people and create an atmosphere of mistrust toward the Krajina negotiators and the government. Nobody can negotiate about the fate of western Slavonia without the representatives of the people from this area.

The territory of western Slavonia is the indivisible and unalienable state territory of the republic of Serbian Krajina and we will defend it unyieldingly in the diplomatic and military sphere. Jelena Tanjga [as heard].

Tudjman on Global Conference, Jasenovac Memorial

LD2610165093 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1458 GMT 26 Oct 93

[Text] Zagreb, 26 Oct (TANJUG)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman told the Zagreb weekly DANAS that a new, global conference on the former Yugoslavia, that is, a Balkan conference, could in a certain sense be "positive," but, as he said, the question is what it would aim to achieve.

"The only advantage that the idea of a global conference on Yugoslavia could have for us is that it would have to start from the recognition of the borders as they were in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that the principle of national minorities having the same rights in all the emerging states should be clearly defined," Tudjman said.

This means, he added, "that the Serbs in Croatia cannot demand more rights than, not only the Albanians, but also the Croats and Hungarians in Serbia."

We would be against the global conference "if it opened a Pandora's box, caused the continuation of the war in Bosnia, and postponed the solution of the UN protected areas," the Croatian president said.

He stressed that Croatia was in favor of "a global solution for the problem of the UN protected areas and the ending of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina" because this is, as Tudjman believes, "an important issue in the territory of the former Yugoslavia." Tudjman says that Croatia will advocate such an approach in international circles.

Elaborating on his recent statement on Jasenovac, Tudjman said that, in his opinion, this should be a common grave for all those who had fallen since the beginning of the Second World War until this day and that the motivating force behind it should be "not only Croat, but global reconciliation."

Jasenovac [death camp in Croatia in Second World War], in Tudjman's assessment, "was a consequence of the ideological division of Europe and the world into two opposed concepts—fascism and communism."

"Instead of having several memorials, why not designate this particular spot as a symbol of the times and prove that we have finally surmounted all that."

In other words, Tudjman underlined, "we have condemned Jasenovac and what the NDH [Independent State of Croatia—Nazi puppet state in Second World War] had done to the Serbs, the Jews, and the anti-fascist Croats."

Likewise, he added, "we should condemn communism for the lives it has taken."

Therefore, Tudjman concluded, "since there is a memorial there already, we should establish the historical truth and honor the Jewish, Serb, and Croat victims. Everybody should have their own memorial, museum, chapel, as testimony to a period in history."

Such a place, the Croatian president believes, "could become a place of reconciliation, rapprochement and an appeal to all people to prevent such a thing from recurring ever again."

Peterle 'Surprised' by Kohl Statement on EC

AU2710171993 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Report by Marta Kos from Duesseldorf]

[Excerpts] After Bavaria and Baden-Wurtemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia will, so it seems, be the third German state with which Slovenia will establish closer links. Minister Peterle held talks with its deputy prime minister and bankers today. They all expressed desire for cooperation throughout the economy, and especially in branches where North Rhine-Westphalia is the strongest, that is, science and craft. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Peterle gave a lecture on the position of Slovenia in Central Europe in the Industrial and Trade Chamber in Dortmund last night. He emphasized, on several occasions, that Slovenia very much appreciates German assistance in the process of Slovenia gaining its independence. Regarding criticisms that the recognition took place too soon, Peterle said that it was by all means too late. Namely, it is well known that Germany had many problems in the European Community when it was urging the recognition of Slovenia and that is why Germany is nowadays perhaps too reserved at times.

This is the only way that we can understand yesterday's statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl who had said that he did not wish the successors of the disintegrated Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania to become full-fledged EC members. Following this logic, Kohl, therefore, does not want to see Slovenia in the European Community either.

The question poses itself of whether this is really the case as all German politicians express understanding for Slovenia's desire to join the European systems, which they reassured to Lojze Peterle today and yesterday. Slovenia is not explicitly mentioned in the statement by Chancellor Kohl, however, in all of his speeches regarding former Yugoslavia so far, he has never singled Slovenia out.

Minister Peterle was very surprised when he heard Kohl's words, but said he believed that they did not refer to Slovenia.

Statement 'Incorrectly' Reported

AU2810063693 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] A statement by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that he rejects the membership of successor states to former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania in the European Community, has resounded unpleasantly throughout Slovenia. What did Chancellor Kohl actually say? Marta Kos reports:

[Begin recording] Definitely not what the ASSOCIATED PRESS new agency has published. It is interesting to note that the ASSOCIATED PRESS is the only agency that reported the words of Chancellor Kohl at the economic forum in Bonn yesterday in such a light.

Chancellor did not explicitly mention Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, or the successors to Yugoslavia in his speech at all.

I asked for an explanation in the German Government Information Bureau from where they sent me Chancellor's speech and told me that the ASSOCIATED PRESS reporter had simply formulated this incorrectly. Namely, Kohl said the following, quote: I believe that it is crucial for us, the Germans, that, regarding integration with the European Community, we advocate the Czechs and the Slovaks, the Poles, and the Hungarians, and if they wish so, also the Baltic states. In my opinion this will be the limit toward the East. End quote.

I have also asked the ASSOCIATED PRESS reporter that listened to Chancellor's speech directly for his opinion. He confirmed Kohl's words to me, as well as that the news referring to the exclusion of Yugoslavia's successors was his interpretation—in the sense that if Kohl did not mention them, then he does not want them to be in the European Community.

It would be almost irrational for Kohl to dare to utter such words, as he also said in this same speech that it would be intolerable if the borders between Germany and Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic would become the eastern border of the future political union. [end recording]

Federal

October Inflation Rate Reaches 1,896 Percent

LD2710203293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1816
GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Belgrade, October 27 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavs lived in October with a monthly inflation rate of 1,896 percent, that is, a daily inflation rate of 10.5 percent, which is an absolute record, Assistant Director-General of the Federal Statistics Bureau Mirjana Rankovic told a news conference on Wednesday [27 October].

The previous record was in August, when the monthly inflation rate stood at 1,880.6 percent. It is no consolation whatsoever to Yugoslavs that the inflation for October did not exceed 2,000 percent as predicted. The rise in living costs did, however, exceed the figure of 2,000 and stood at 2,050 percent.

Yugoslavia ends the month of October with an annual inflation rate of 1,942,461.051 percent, meaning that the annual inflation for the first ten months of this year is nearly 20 million times higher than for the same period of 1992.

The steep increase in the inflation has mainly been due to higher prices of services, which rose 2,896 percent in October alone. The Yugoslav economy is on the brink of a collapse due to the 17-month-old U.N. Security Council sanctions. Producers are daily hiking their prices in an effort to survive.

Spokesman Views Drop in Aid for Refugees

LD2710125493 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1114
GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Novi Sad, October 27 (TANJUG)—Humanitarian aid intended for refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is arriving more and more irregularly and in smaller quantities, spokesman for the commissariat for refugees in Vojvodina, the northern province of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, Sima Teofanov has said.

He said humanitarian deliveries could cover at this moment only one fifth or one fourth at the utmost of the needs of the refugees who have found shelter in the Yugoslav territory.

As announced by the republican commissariat for refugees, there are currently in Yugoslavia 495,000 registered refugees from the former Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, as many as 200,000 of whom are children and young people up to 18 years of age while half a million are women and 50,000 old people.

At the threshold of another winter in war, the information that hitherto rare diseases, such as tuberculosis, are on the rise and that patients include people under 35 years of age comes as a disturbing fact, said Teofanov.

There can be no justification for the world powers to ignore the delivery of humanitarian aid under the pretext that it is

not reaching the right hands. Every delivery is controlled by officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and there are documents showing the recipients of the humanitarian packages, said Teofanov.

The only true humanitarian supplies have arrived over the past few months from clubs rallying Serbs and Yugoslavs throughout the world, he said and added that even those supplies were reaching refugees in Yugoslavia with difficulty and after complications on the borders.

Without that assistance, the situation which is currently burdening nearly half a million refugees and an increasingly large number of Yugoslav citizens as a result of the tough U.N. sanctions would be quite hopeless, said Teofanov.

Romanian Passenger Vessel Blocked Near Belgrade

AU2710122493 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in
Romanian 1100 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Representatives of the Giurgiunav SA Danube shipping company have told our reporter, Doru Dinu Glavan, that the Romanian international tourist vessel the Steaua Dunarii, which is on its way home, is currently being blocked on the Danube in the Belgrade area. Mr. Bone Stan, the general director of the company, who is in permanent contact with the commander of the ship, said that those aboard the Steaua Dunarii are the bridge, engineering, and auxiliary personnel.

According to information available at Giurgiunav SA, the Danube has been blocked by means of small boats and even deactivated mines by two [Serbian] non-governmental organizations that call themselves the White Rose and New Byzantium.

This morning a second Romanian international tourist vessel, the Steaua Deltei, sailing downstream from Hungary, entered Yugoslav waters. The ship will join the other one and wait for the conclusion of negotiations with the two non-governmental organizations on obtaining permission to continue their journey to their home port of Giurgiu. Both vessels had been transporting passengers, on the basis of a contract, on the route between Budapest and Passau, Germany.

Serbia

Seselj's Party Preparing for Campaign

AU2710145793 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
27 Oct 93 p 5

[Report by B. Jaksic: "Giving Up Would Benefit Authorities"]

[Text] Yesterday's program "Reserved For" on Radio Smederevo featured Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS]. Since the time of the elections is drawing near, the SRS has launched its preparations and campaign.

"Milosevic did not take us by surprise in principle when he dissolved the assembly, but we certainly had not expected it to happen so soon. It was done in the panicky fear of losing power," Seselj said.

"Milosevic's comment that the debates in the assembly had fallen below the acceptable level are also unfounded. He should accept the fact that this is an institution that the people elected. Relations and debates in it reflect the people. If such a nation does not suit someone, then he should look for another country. I myself do not think that anything was wrong with the level as all the debates were based on arguments and energetic," Seselj said.

Asked how much the SRS itself was responsible for the situation in the country and the conduct of its policy, Seselj explained that the conflicts with the ruling party began in February over the vote on the budget. The SRS voted against the budget but, since the Democratic Movement of Serbia refused to take part in it, its vote was overridden. As for the legal projects, the ruling party had to get its chance. "That was our moral obligation, but also a justification, so no one can say sooner or later that we had prevented something that may essentially have been good," Seselj said.

The media campaign is an essential part of the elections. The SRS is counting on a tough campaign that will try to discredit it. However, according to the SRS leader, they should definitely run in the elections, otherwise they would be doing a great favor to the authorities. "They would pay us in gold if we were to do that," Seselj said.

Macedonia

Border With Yugoslavia Blocked

LD2710141793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1228 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Text] Nis, 27 Oct (TANJUG)—Customs officials from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have not been allowing any trucks from Yugoslavia to enter Macedonia at the border crossing near Presevo on the Yugoslav-Macedonian border. Checks on buses and passenger cars have also been stepped-up.

The blockade of freight traffic imposed by former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia authorities has been eased sporadically by allowing empty trucks to enter Macedonia, mostly those with Macedonian and foreign registration plates. Railway traffic has been reduced to a minimum.

There is a traffic jam at the Gradina border crossing on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. Two columns of cars are leaving our country without significant delays but there is a major holdup on the Bulgarian side. Passenger cars and buses have been waiting for a number of hours to leave Bulgaria.

Exports Increase by 10 Percent Over Past Year

AU2810064493 Skopje MIC in English 26 Oct 93

[Unattributed report: "Economic Review: Total Exports During the First Six Months"]

[Text] The most recent Government report says that during the first six months of this year, Macedonia has achieved a total export of goods in the amounts of \$483.4 million, and an import of goods valued at \$533 million.

Compared to the same time last year, there is a recorded increase in the foreign trade of some 10.7 percent, while the import has increased by 9.9 percent.

President Views Talks in France as 'Successful'

LD2710120793 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 2100 GMT 26 Oct 93

[Excerpt] Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov returned to Skopje this afternoon from a two-day working visit to France. On his return he made the following statement for the press:

[Begin recording] I believe that this visit came at the right time if we link it with the latest developments in connection with the recognition of Macedonia; we had talks with official circles in France, and I think they were successful, but we also had talks with wider intellectual circles. We informed them about our stands, with our views of the problems that are not only directly linked with the recognition of Macedonia today, but also with the so-called territory of former Yugoslavia and possible combinations that have been subject of discussions. I think that public information media showed unprecedented interest at today's press conference.

In my talks with French official circles my primary task was to ask France to lend us support in our demand for negotiations with the European Community in connection with the conclusion of an agreement on the economic and political cooperation, and, of course, we presented our position concerning further development of relations with France.

Positive evolution has been noted as regards France's stand toward its further relations with Macedonia. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Gligorov Appeals for Admission to CSCE

AU2610174893 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 26 Oct 93

[Unattributed report: "Inalienability of the Right to a Name"]

[Text] Speaking in front of the French Institute for International Relations on the subject "Macedonia and the New Europe," President Gligorov pointed out that a people's right to a name is a natural and an inalienable one. The Macedonian people has a Slavic origin and has

come on the Balkans in the 6th and 7th centuries A.D. It has its own authentic culture, language, and history. It was on this territory that the first Slavic letters and literature were born, and it was also here that the Slavs were converted to Christianity for the first time in history, explained Mr. Gligorov. That is why we do not have to identify ourselves with the culture and civilization of other peoples, nor with their contemporary achievements.

It is of a great interest for us to overcome the present dispute with Greece, and that is why we agreed to direct talks with Greece in the United Nations. Macedonia is the road to Europe for the Greeks. And Greece is Macedonia's exit to the sea. Greece is a member of the EC [European Community]. Those are the inevitable facts of the reality. I sincerely hope that the talks with the new Greek Government will continue in this realistic approach, stated the president.

Mr. Gligorov also appealed for an urgent and unconditional admission of Macedonia in the CSCE at the next Ministry conference in Rome.

In reference to the affirmation of the idea for a new international conference for Yugoslavia, i.e. continuing of the London conference, President Gligorov said that Macedonia supports every suggestion that will contribute to bringing a stable peace in the region. Macedonia does not reject the possibility and eventual necessity of a new kind of collaborating and economic relations in this part of the region, but strongly opposes the idea of mechanically putting together of all the problems on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The world must not ignore the crucial changes that took place in the past three years during the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and should respect the [words indistinct].

Resignation of Albanian Party Secretary Viewed

AU2710131293 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 19 Oct 93 p 4

[Commentary by Panta Dzambazovski: "He Could Not Stand Pressure From the Radicals"]

[Text] On 16 October PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] Secretary Mithat Emini submitted his irrevocable resignation, for reasons of health, as he put it.

Emini's resignation came as a surprise to the party leadership and delegate group, no less than to the public. Delegate Naser Ziberi told us that he had heard about the resignation on television and that the delegate group had not yet formulated an opinion on the matter. PDP President Nevzat Halili told us he himself was surprised. Unfortunately, they said, since the resignation is irrevocable there is virtually no possibility of rejecting it. There is probably a certain amount of disappointment with Emini because of the situation in the party and the persistent requests for his resignation by the Tetovo branch leaders. Halili also added that it was true that

Emini was in poor health, but in any case the presidency would hold a meeting to discuss the subject.

Emini was one of the founders of the PDP and a key figure in shaping its political activities. He favored patient dialogue on all issues, whether internal party matters or discussions at state level on the status of the Albanians. He defended the interests of the Albanians in Macedonia, but, being a realistic type of politician, he took into consideration the political climate in the state. He believed that, in order to satisfy the demands of the Albanians, it was important to participate in the institutions of the system and then take part in the government coalition. However, as for the revival of the so-called referendum on political and territorial autonomy for the Albanians in Macedonia, he said it was not yet time. It was precisely on these two points that differing opinions appeared in the hitherto "unanimous" party. Emini was the first person to talk publicly (in his interview for NOVA MAKEDONIJA) about the existence of forces endeavoring to radicalize the ethnic demands. In his next interview, again for our newspaper, he specifically confirmed the existence of these forces, emphasizing that he was their strongest opponent. It is therefore utterly clear why the forces that he called "nihilist," in their efforts to radicalize the party policy considered Emini to be their greatest obstacle.

The radical forces succeeded in taking over the key positions in the Tetovo branch in June and then began their struggle. The first action was to hold a vote of no confidence in Emini, the PDP secretary, contrary to the party statute.

This act marked the beginning of deep turmoil in the PDP, and the Tetovo branch leaders did not confine themselves simply to requesting that Emini be replaced; They also demanded the replacement of President Nevzat Halili and Vice Presidents Sami Ibraimi and Arif Vicna. The reasons given were that "they were not sufficiently responsive to the ethnic demands and the revival of the so-called referendum." There were long discussions and negotiations at all levels of the PDP, even with the Tetovo group, and it was expected that a solution would be found at the Central Assembly of the party, which was several times scheduled, rescheduled, postponed, and then interrupted. Finally an extraordinary congress was scheduled for not later than 1 December. Until then, any activities to do with the internal turmoil were to be "frozen." This solution was influenced by the delegate group and the government ministers belonging to the party.

Despite all this, relations within the party are still disturbed, and moreover there is a division between the "soft" and "hard" lines (the former supporting Emini, and the latter supporting the Tetovo group, which some people in the know claim is in favor of abandoning the institutions of the system), judging by Emini's resignation (unless poor health really was the cause), the offensive by the Tetovo branch is

continuing, alongside the accusations by its leaders that the party secretary is to blame for the present status of the Albanians in Macedonia.

If his resignation is not withdrawn, the PDP will be poorer by one politician and architect of party policy, and the positions of Halili and the two vice presidents will weaken. The outcome of the forthcoming congress will determine the future PDP policy toward the actions of our state, that is, whether there will be a swing to the right.

Vojvodina

Ethnic Hungarians Reportedly Emigrate En Masse

AU2710171193 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16-17 Oct pp 6, 7

[Report by Zuzana Surenecs: "Man's Revolt Against Being a National Unit"]

[Text] At first he did not want to hear about talking with us. He said: "There is nothing about painful things to be explained." His decision is to bid farewell to his country. He is 37 years old, an engineer, on forced vacation, has a salary of seven German marks, a pregnant wife, a child in elementary school, and an approved application for emigration to Hungary.

He is one of those in the latest wave of emigration that is currently under way. He is one of those who, as Andras Agoston, leader of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM], puts it in his recently published open letter, who "are fleeing unemployment, winter, humiliation, and an unsafe future." The leader of the political organization of the Vojvodina Hungarians also believes that the efforts made by the Vojvodina Hungarians to achieve autonomy are well-founded, and internationally acceptable, while such autonomy is a precondition and guarantee for the preservation of national identity. Therefore, although he knows it is doubtful whether awareness of such chances will halt the wave of emigration, he believes that "if the emigrants stop and think about it for a minute, then what we have done is not in vain."

I ask the man we talked with whether Agoston's letter made him waver, or at least stop for a minute to think about it.

"Rather than hours and minutes, I thought about it over many days and nights. For an entire year I weighed the decision. I went through great torment, seeking and weighing up reasons, arguments and counterarguments. I imagined myself and my family leaving our home—but what if it comes to my wife's giving birth and there are no medicines? I imagined taking leave of my friends, but the next thought was: For how long am I not going to be able to buy my son a chocolate bar? And how long is a man supposed to put up with despair, hopelessness, and

fear, just because everything is all right as long as the firearms keep silent? Which is to say, a man is supposed to put up with being less and less dignified, a human being, and being more and more a national unit. This, or that, or some other nationality—it does not matter. I brooded over it for a long time, contemplating, contradicting myself—and I finally made the decision. Now there is nothing that can make me waver or give up. Therefore there is nothing to talk about. One ought to keep one's mouth shut and leave. I am no longer interested in any politics, any national interest. And I do not want to live for them. I want to live for my family, to work, to support it, to feel no fear any longer. I want a peaceful, ordinary civil life. I am going to sell whatever can be sold, take with me whatever can be taken, and I am leaving. I want some hope for my son, for my second child who will be born soon...."

A lawyer from Novi Sad reveals to us that his office alone is currently processing hundreds of applications for emigration to Hungary. As he says, most people emigrate to Hungary, but there are many who want to go to other countries. He says that no client of his has ever suggested he or she has been threatened. It is mainly ethnic Hungarians from all over Vojvodina that come to him for help. He knows that his colleagues are also quite busy, and estimates that several thousands of cases must be being processed now. For instance, there are statistics showing that in less than one year 900 families left the township of Ada, which has only 14,000 inhabitants. Eyewitnesses claim that in the last few days the entrance to the Hungarian Embassy has been teeming with people, waiting their turn to apply to emigrate. Still, reality can be best seen in the newspaper ads: In MADJAR SOU 10 private transport firms regularly advertise their services for people moving to Hungary, and real estate firms advertise property throughout Hungary for sale.

It is Agoston who first reacted with the aforementioned letter on this wave of emigration of ethnic Hungarians, since now entire families are leaving (earlier it was those dodging mobilization). "If the emigration wave continues, then all our efforts have been in vain, our feeling, although ephemeral, that we mean something as a community and political force was also in vain, whereas our plans and hopes may easily turn abortive. If we disperse and scatter all over the world, the preconditions for the accomplishment of our autonomy will be nullified, because there will be no one to jointly struggle with, nor will there be anything to struggle for." Agoston appeals to his fellow-countrymen.

He also states that the DZVM was also in a dilemma, that it was weighing up and considering how to react. "We wanted to emphasize that our intention is not to interfere in the decisions of those people. These are delicate things, politics must not interfere in the personal decisions of individuals. However, it has to give its judgment on certain occurrences. That is the reason it took us such a long time to react since we perceived the tendency for the first time," Agoston states. To the question whether he has any facts to corroborate, as he

puts it, the tragic emigration wave of ethnic Hungarians, Agoston says that in this case they do not have such reliable records as they had at the time when 25,000 young men left the country, dodging mobilization.

"People are simply leaving, they are saying nothing about it to anybody, their relatives are keeping silent. Still, on the basis of certain information we estimate that around 5,000 people have left by now, which makes a total of 30,000. You know, when 35 families leave Ada—and so many of them are leaving these days for Canada—it is really difficult not to notice it," Agoston explains.

He also believes there are two main reasons for the current emigration. According to him, one of them is the psychological warfare waged against the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, while the second is the social factor. "We are even more badly affected by the embargo than the other parts of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], because in the conditions when the political idea of establishment of the national state is present, unemployment threatens the members of the national minorities much more than the others," Agoston says. Corroborating his words, he cites data showing that, for instance, in the last few years the number of ethnic Hungarian judges among the magistrates has dropped by 26 percent, they have been completely excluded from functions like chairman of a district or county court, or from posts in the administration, while ethnic Hungarians usually top the list of dismissals from state-owned firms. In the last three years the number of classes in elementary and high-schools designed for those whose mother tongue is Hungarian has been reduced by 30 percent....

Asked to clarify what he meant by psychological warfare, Agoston mentions the attitude of the state services, police, and army toward the ethnic Hungarians: "Let us say we have an entire series of unresolved attacks against Hungarians based on purely national grounds. In the place where such an attack happened everybody knows who did it, except the police. For instance, a bomb was thrown at the house of the local chairman of our party in Novi Knezevac. One of our officials in Bajmok was beaten up during an official celebration, somebody opened fire at the window of the chairman of our board in Krusic, and the members of the managing board of a local community in Miletic were collectively beaten up," Agoston states.

According to him, psychological pressure is exerted also on youngsters who are about to serve in the Yugoslav Army. "For instance, the youngsters who have been granted scholarships for studies in Hungary, are not allowed to postpone military service. All that is quite humiliating for the people, and is felt as pressure," Agoston says.

We ask him what the goal of his open letter was. He says: "That letter does not appeal to ethnic Hungarians to stay. By that letter we are making clear to all that we shall

continue to struggle following democratic principles, in order to create better conditions for them to live here."

The ethnic Hungarians are leaving more or less nationally homogeneous environments. It is mostly younger, more ingenious, and better qualified, or wealthier people who are leaving. As Agoston informs us, even the members of the DZVM, members of its branches, or nonpartisan people are leaving. We ask Agoston whether the DZVM will try to exert any sort of influence on the Hungarian authorities with regard to ethnic Hungarian emigration.

"That is the topic of our talks in Hungary. We demand two things: the Hungarian public ought to be better informed about our aspiration to autonomy, while particularly the Hungarian diplomacy ought to help in explaining that the autonomy is a precondition for our remaining here. We hold a liberal view, and believe it is neither possible, nor necessary to implement state measures to induce one people to emigrate. We believe it is necessary to have open borders to the extent that enables people to come and go. Besides, we shall officially demand that those people be granted dual citizenship, as well as that ethnic Serbs in Hungary be given autonomy as well.

"If the conditions of a market economy develop here as well, then a great number of people will return, capital will start accumulating right here—in the border area. As for the current emigration, however, we are doing nothing to prevent it, or to slow it down. We are only making efforts to create conditions for those people to come back," Agoston explains.

Agoston's fellow-countryman Djerdj Ozer, member of the Executive Board of the Reformatory Democratic Party of Vojvodina [RDSV], holds a different attitude toward the ethnic Hungarian emigration, as well as toward their possible return. Some time ago a great preselection dust was raised by letters exchanged between RDSV official Tibor Varadi and Andras, regarding the future of Vojvodina and Hungarians living there. Ozer agrees that the emigration is one of the most tragic occurrences in Vojvodina's present, adding how painful the leave-taking of the closest family members, neighbors, and fellow-citizens is, and even of property that is often sold for next to nothing. Still, the emigration of ethnic Hungarians from Vojvodina has been publicly discussed these days, he says:

"Although we got used to the DZVM's habit of dividing ethnic Hungarians into good guys and bad guys, Agoston's letter has surprised me, because he is trying to categorize the human misfortune—in this case it is the emigration—into justified emigration, referring to draft dodgers, and unjustified one, referring to all other cases. I think that the DZVM does not have the moral right to categorize it in such a way, because it has itself contributed to the emigration of ethnic Hungarians. I remind you of Agoston's famous threat with the emigration of 150,000 ethnic Hungarians, his encouraging attitude

toward studying abroad (by the way, most of the DZVM officials' children study abroad), the DZVM's explicit attitude against the adoption of the Law on Amnesty, while it also did not take great pains over preservation of the inter-ethnic trust and tolerance here, without which Vojvodina will take a long time to become rich and attractive again for possible returnees, and certainly for temporary ethnic Hungarian emigres."

To the question what could make the emigres come back, and keep them here, Ozer says:

"I doubt that ethnic Hungarian emigres can be attracted back by the idea of ethnic autonomy, which is the only thing Agoston offers them in his letter. Because, if they had believed in it, they would not have left. I am convinced that they would be much more pleased to see a prosperous Vojvodina in which there are plenty of kindergartens, schools, newspapers for children and adults, and theaters in the mother tongue for all citizens."

[Box, page 7]

"In any case, peace and cooperation suits us, because we are the weaker side," Agoston comments on meetings of

the representatives of the DZVM and the Socialist Party of Vojvodina, which have become quite frequent recently, which has made the public speculate about their reconciliation, and even a possible bargain between the two, with the ethnic Hungarian autonomy being the stake in the game. We ask Agoston whether the optimism that has been expressed about eventual autonomy and the conviction that better days are coming can be put in connection with those meetings.

"Some deeper processes are involved, and the international aspect is very important. Finally, our policy is that one should always be open, and talk with everybody. Our starting point is that people here have always lived together, and we also count on their desire to eventually see this crisis defeated and overcome. Those are my impressions. Besides, we are aware that even if it is, the Socialist Party of Serbia alone cannot give us autonomy, for that can be done only by state institutions. On the other hand, we can and should discuss the concrete problems with the local authorities. True, we do not have illusions that those problems will be immediately resolved, but we want to show our cooperativeness and readiness to start a dialogue," Agoston says.